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Throughout history, humanity has perceived the military to be the domain of men. The 
reality is that this is a superficial perspective. Though the majority of combatants have 
always been male, there are numerous examples of women who have fought alongside, 
and even led, these men. Moreover, the female population has often been forced to 
endure some of the worst effects of war. 
As society has evolved toward democracy and embraced liberal values, the 
military world has increasingly been expected to align itself with principles of gender 
equality and protection of human rights. This need was recognized by the world 
community in 2000 when the United Nations passed UNSCR 1325, ensuring that women 
would become greater participants in conflict resolution. In the years since, NATO has 
also worked to encourage more female presence in its own ranks. 
This thesis studies the potential benefits to Ukraine’s armed forces that can be 
gained by increased female participation. To achieve this understanding, a thorough study 
of civil-military relations and gender issues is conducted, along with an analysis of UN 
and NATO experiences in their respective attempts to boost the role of women in conflict 
zones. Finally, the current situation of servicewomen in Ukraine’s own armed forces is 
scrutinized in order to make recommendations for future policy. 
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Ukraine is a relatively young post-Soviet country with all the advantages and 
challenges that this status implies. The legacy of the recent past and the tensions of the 
present are, perhaps, most clearly felt in the realm of gender policy, specifically the 
equality for women in such sectors as the armed forces. Even though the previous regime 
did not officially discriminate against women in education or employment, real gender 
equality was never accepted in society or pursued by the government through, for 
example, the creation of institutional mechanisms to foster genuine gender equality to 
match the loftiest rhetoric of Marxism-Leninism.1 
The situation has not changed much during the years of Ukraine’s independence, 
despite the high hopes for social liberalization that came with the so-called Orange 
Revolution in 2004. The new and improved Ukraine was supposed to elevate all 
citizens―men and women alike―to their full, democratic potential. And, indeed, in 
2010, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense expanded the list of military specialties for 
women by 70 percent.2 At the same time, however, the armed forces remain one of the 
few institutions in which women routinely are assigned the lowest-paid jobs, for example, 
telephone operator, clerical, and secretarial positions, among others.3 Restrictions 
preventing women from taking some specific jobs in the military also exist in Ukraine. 
According to the 1994 Order of the Minister of Defense of Ukraine, women are not 
allowed to be commanders of artillery, of tanks, and of fighting vehicles; similarly a 
woman cannot be a de-miner or combat engineer, nor can she occupy other military 
positions associated with excessive strain on the body.4 In addition, gender bans persist 
for women in particular military jobs, for example, Special Forces positions, navy 
1 Dono Abdurazakova, National Mechanisms for Gender Equality in South-East and Eastern Europe, 
Caucasus and Central Asia: Regional Study (New York: United Nations, 2010), 9. 
2 Diana Eremenko, “The Defenders of the Motherland: The Attitude toward Women in the Military,” 
Tochka Net News, last modified February 23, 2012, http://news.tochka.net/ua/110206-zashchitnitsy-otechestva-
kak-otnosyatsya-k-zhenshchinam-v-armii-foto/. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Aleksey Sahno, “Women are Attacking…The Military,” Military Panorama, last modified March 8, 
2014, http://wartime.org.ua/1325-zhnki-nastupayut-na-armyu.html. 
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positions, and specialties dealing with explosives and with chemical substances. 
Furthermore, women cannot enroll in the military lyceums, the former Suvorov colleges. 
They are not allowed to enter the Sevastopol Military Academy, the Lviv Military 
Academy that prepares platoon commanders, or the Kharkiv Military Academy that 
prepares pilots and radio engineers.5 
With such restrictions that Ukraine places on women, the effectiveness of the 
security forces (i.e., “the effectiveness of what the organization is supposed to be good 
at―using force, or the threat of force―for security, stability, or plain victory”)6 may 
suffer. One of the main challenges in the contemporary world is “to develop effective 
militaries…that are able to implement a broad variety of roles and missions.”7 Taking 
into consideration that, on the one hand, Ukraine’s military, like other national armies, 
has, until recently, spent less time protecting its own borders and more on international 
operations, while, on the other hand, that the United Nations (UN) and North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) are opening more positions for women in military 
operations, it is important to train and prepare Ukrainian women soldiers to take part in 
missions that require their presence. 
Twenty years on, at least half of Ukrainian society―the female half―continues 
to count as second-best soldiers and thus, quite possibly, second-best citizens. At the 
beginning of 2013, more than 47,000 women were serving and working in the Ukrainian 
army, and nearly one-third of these women were uniformed. More than 1,600 of these 
uniformed women were officers, 4,700 of them were sergeants and 9,770 were contract 
soldiers.8 Thus, women at arms make up an integral part of all military personnel in the 
Ukrainian Armed Forces, even amid the career restrictions they face. There is, however, 
still a very low number of Ukrainian military women who take part in the military 
5 Eremenko, “The Defenders of the Motherland.”  
6 Robert Egnell, “Women in Battle, Gender Perspectives and Fighting,” Parameters 43, no. 2 (2013): 
34. 
7 Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military 
Relations (New York: Routledge, 2012), 29. 
8 “More than 47,000 women are serving and employed in the Armed Forces of Ukraine,” 
Governmental portal, accessed September 10, 2013, 
http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/ru/publish/article?art_id=246126441&cat_id=244277212.  
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missions abroad. Since 1992 more than 37,000 servicemen of the Armed Forces of 
Ukraine have participated in various peacekeeping operations.9 Of them, only 
approximately 50 were women.10 In 2012, 476 servicemen of the Armed Forces of 
Ukraine were participating in 11 peacekeeping missions and other operations.11 In 2015 
the number increased to 550 servicemen of the Armed Forces of Ukraine participating in 
10 missions abroad despite Ukraine’s internal conflict,12 but few women have 
participated. For instance, in 2013, there were only a handful of women (including Major 
Valeria Romanova, Officer of the Military Aid; and Major of Medical Service Adushkina 
Elena, Senior Officer of the Military Aid) from Ukraine taking part in military missions 
abroad.13 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Even though no legal prohibition related to the participation of women in combat 
or in other military operations exists in Ukraine, other kinds of restrictions, including 
social ones, cause a low rate of women’s participation in military operations. Without the 
necessary experience in and of military operations, women can face unequal 
opportunities in the Ukrainian military because very often they are seen as second-rate 
military personnel who are not professionals. 
The present thesis explores theories and facts that support and oppose deployment 
of women at arms in military missions abroad. The main focus, however, is placed on 
lessons learned from UN and NATO military operations, to see whether women at arms 
are necessary in military missions. The overarching research questions of this thesis are: 
9 “Participation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the Multinational Peacekeeping Operations,” 
Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, accessed January 2, 2015, http://www.mil.gov.ua/diyalnist/mirotvorchist/. 
10 “More than 47,000 women are serving and employed.” 
11 “Ukrainian Peacemakers to Keep Watch Over Presidential Inauguration in Liberia,” Worldwide 
News Ukraine, last modified January 11, 2012, http://wnu-ukraine.com/news/politics/?id=1253.  
12 “Participation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the Multinational Peacekeeping Operations in 
2015,” Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, accessed March 31, 2015, 
http://www.mil.gov.ua/diyalnist/mirotvorchist/uchast-zbrojnih-sil-ukraini-u-mizhnarodnih-operacziyah-z-
pidtrimannya-miru-i-bezpeki.html.  
13 Excerpts from the Orders about Personnel, September 28, 2012, № 806 and № 170 from June 14, 
2013. (Kyiv: Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, 2013).   
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What is the role of female soldiers in UN and NATO missions? What lessons, if any, can 
be drawn from these experiences to apply in Ukraine?  
B. IMPORTANCE 
Until recently, Ukraine’s main goal was to transform its armed forces into a 
professional army that would be able to fulfill a variety of assigned tasks.14 Thus, the 
country had to undertake substantial changes in how its armed forces were structured, as 
well as reform how it conducted its military operations and understood its military 
identity. This process of change led to the goals outlined in “The Concept of Reform and 
Development of the Ukrainian Armed Forces for the Period to 2017,” which was 
formulated in 2012 and endorsed by then-president Victor Yanukovych.15 The primary 
purpose was to create new, highly qualified, well-equipped and -trained, professional, 
and mobile armed forces of the European type, which would be able to address 
contemporary threats.16 Simultaneously, the Ministry of Defense planned to transform 
the military into an all-volunteer force.17 The main goal of such changes was to make the 
armed forces of Ukraine not only smaller in number but also more professional and, thus, 
to enhance the effectiveness of the military. This new strategy for professionalization 
would apply to women, because they make up a substantial amount of military personnel 
in the Ukrainian Armed Forces; all of them are volunteers.18   
14 Samuel Huntington posits that a professional military consists of soldiers, who are professionals in 
management of violence. To become such professionals, soldiers should gain expertise that is “acquired by 
prolonged education and experience,” they should understand that the “responsibility to serve and devotion 
to…[their] skill[s] furnish the professional motive,” and they should receive proper training necessary for 
professional competence that will help to establish the sense of unity in the military organization. 
Moreover, professionals should possess written codes of ethics. (in Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the 
State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1954), 7–18.) 
15 The White Book of Ukrainian Armed Forces in 2012 (Kiev: Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, 2013), 
9. 
16 Ibid. 
17 “Ukrainian Army Will Reduce its Personnel Number to 122 Thousand,” The Money, last modified 
June 28, 2013, http://news.finance.ua/ua/~/1/0/all/2013/06/28/304288.  
18 “The Percentage of Females in the Ukrainian Armed Forces is Higher than the Percentage of 
Women in the Armed Forces of the USA,” The Comments, last modified March 7, 2013, 
http://ua.comments.ua/life/197248-v-ukrainskiy-armii-vidsotok-zhinok.html. 
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However, the events that unfolded in the next two years interfered with these 
goals and contributed to Ukraine’s decision to set aside its priorities of an all-volunteer, 
professional fighting force. By spring of 2014, the Euromaidan19 protests forced 
President Yanukovych to flee to Russia.20 Ukraine’s Verkhovna Rada removed him from 
office formally. Russia, in turn, annexed the Crimean peninsula and began supporting a 
full-scale insurgency in the Eastern region of Ukraine.21 The interim government of 
Ukraine felt compelled to reinstate conscription in order to address the threat in the 
19 “Euro-Maidan,” or literally “Euro Square,” started as a wave of peaceful demonstrations in 
Independence Square in the capital of Ukraine—Kiev—in November 2013, after the president of Ukraine, 
Viktor Yanukovych, suspended preparations for signing the Ukraine-European Union Association 
Agreement in favor of stronger ties with Russia (see Carmen Fishwick, “We Were So Naive and 
Optimistic: Ukraine Euromaidan Protesters Tell Us What’s Changed for Them,” Guardian, March 4, 2014, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/04/ukraine-crisis-protesters-kiev-euromaidan-independence-square. 
Yanukovych decided to take a loan of 15 billion dollars from Russia and increase Ukraine’s dependence on 
the Kremlin (see Timothy Heritage and Katya Golubkova, “Ukraine Leader Seeks Cash at Kremlin, Kiev 
Protest Planned,” Reuters, December 16, 2013, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/12/16/uk-ukraine-protest-
idUKBRE9BD0E420131216.) To stop the peaceful demonstration, Yanukovych’s government approved new 
anti-protest laws, eroding human rights and freedoms in Ukraine (see “Ukrainian President Approves Strict 
Anti-Protest Laws,” Guardian, January 17, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/17/ukrainian-
president-anti-protest-laws.) The scope of the protests expanded, bringing in more demonstrators, because of 
the widespread government abuse of power, violation of human rights, corruption, and finally, violent 
dispersal of protesters (see “Ukraine Opposition Vows to Continue Struggle after Yanukovych Offer,” 
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, January 25, 2014, http://www.rferl.org/content/protesters-police-tense-
standoff-ukraine/25241945.html.) 
20 The revolution turned out to be very bloody. On February 18, 2014, some 77 unarmed 
demonstrators were killed within 48 hours and nearly 600 were wounded. (See “Why is Ukraine in 
Turmoil?,” BBC News, February 22, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25182823.) Even though 
then-President Yanukovych tried to use the armed forces against protestors after February 18, the sitting 
Chief of General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Vladimir Zamana, refused to carry out the order and 
resigned. Throughout the protests, the military chose to remain neutral. (See “Yanukovych Was Planning to 
Use Military Forces to Stop Maidan Revolution,” Gordon, February 24, 2014, 
http://gordonua.com/news/maidan/SMI-YAnukovich-planiroval-ispolzovat-armiyu-protiv-Maydana-11320.html.) 
Viktor Yanukovych first fled to Crimea, Ukraine and then Vladimir Putin (Russian president) helped him 
to flee to Russia. (See “Putin Declared That He Helped Yanukovych to Flee the Country,” Informational 
Portal of the city of Lugansk, last modified October 24, 2014, 
http://news.lugansk.info/2014/ukraine/10004259.shtml.) According to independent opinions, V. Putin planned an 
invasion of Ukraine in advance after the Orange revolution in Ukraine (November 22, 2004–January 23, 
2005). (See “Putin Bought Crimea from Yanukovych for Fifteen Billion Dollars,” Vlasti, last modified 
March 9, 2014, http://vlasti.net/news/189099.) 
21After the Maidan revolution, following the change of government in Ukraine, the country’s southern 
peninsula (Crimea) was annexed by Moscow on March 18, and the war over the east of Ukraine began, 
involving pro-Russian extremists, who support Moscow’s influence in the region (because they were 
incited by Russian propaganda stating that “the next government of Ukraine will discriminate against 
Russian speakers”) against those “who favor Ukraine free from interference from the Russia.” (See Laura 
Smith-Spark, Diana Magnay, and Victoria Butenko, “Russian Soldiers Detained in Ukraine; Leaders Meet 
in Minsk,” CNN, August 26, 2014, http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/26/world/europe/ukraine-crisis/index.html. See 
also Palash Ghosh, “Ukraine Maidan: Tatars in Crimea Caught in a Complex Conflict with Ethnic Russians 
and Ukrainians,” International Business Times, February 26, 2014, http://www.ibtimes.com/ukraine-maidan-
tatars-crimea-caught-complex-conflict-ethnic-russians-ukrainians-1558124.) 
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east.22 However, even in the face of such a threat, the new strategy does little to bring 
more females into the ranks or to take advantage of the willingness of these volunteers to 
serve in combat or bring their special talents and perspectives to a complex, asymmetrical 
war. 
In actuality, the new circumstances do not preclude the military from undertaking 
the reforms of 2012. Rather, the armed forces of Ukraine would be better prepared to face 
threats were they to have pursued the stated goals of a professional, all-volunteer 
military, staffed by well-trained and equipped soldiers with the patriotic desire to protect 
the country’s borders. The decision of 2015 to draft men aged between 25 and 60 years 
old and women will do little to help make the armed forces more professional and able to 
effectively fight with the contemporary threats.23 The decision to draft ex-military 
women, also, does not bring much of a difference if most of those women were low-
ranking personnel in supportive positions, who were never provided proper education and 
did not gain experience from military operations in the past. Moreover, the long-term 
transformation of societies toward democratic civilian rule requires the crucial step of 
military professionalization. Improving the skills and professional standards of officers, 
non-commissioned officers, and individual soldiers can result in a reduction in services 
and force size, coupled with an increase in personnel quality and effectiveness.24 
Professionalization of the military remains one of the necessary steps in order for Ukraine 
to meet one of Euromaidan’s main goals―integration into the European security 
system.25  
22 “Ukraine Reinstates Conscription as Security Deteriorates in Eastern Region,” Voice of America, 
May 1, 2014, http://www.voanews.com/content/russian-fm-calls-for-dialogue-in-ukraine/1905082.html. 
23 “Ukraine Commences Three-Stage 2015 Military Draft,” PressTV, January 21, 2015, 
http://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2015/01/21/394029/Ukraine-commences-2015-military-draft--.  
24 “Tool Category C: Military Measures. Professionalization of the Military,” Conflict Prevention 
Web, accessed January 26, 2015, 
http://extranet.creativeworldwide.com/CAIIStaff/Dashboard_GIROAdminCAIIStaff/Dashboard_CAIIAdminDatabase/
resources/ghai/toolbox6.htm. 
25 “The Program of the Revolution. The Program of Immediate Reforms of the Country after the 
Overthrow of Yanukovych’s Regime,” accessed January 26, 2015, 
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B__mtqdQ7-UiWjlUR0xaYXFPQ1k/edit.  
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One of the main points about the professional armed forces is that “citizens have a 
right to expect the security forces to be effective in fighting organized crime, 
participating in PSO [peace-support operations] with other respected states, and 
providing humanitarian assistance when disasters occur.”26 In such conditions, to become 
professional military personnel, women at arms—as well as men—must have 
opportunities to receive proper education and experience in the military organizations. 
These opportunities are intended to improve the effectiveness and readiness of military 
forces so that they are capable of defending their country’s interests when necessary.  
Lynda Liddy notes that “professional development occupies a position between 
academic education and military training.”27 She maintains that “the cultivation of the 
skills and knowledge necessary for a soldier to be operationally effective is an outcome 
that draws on both training and education processes.”28 The professional development of 
military personnel is complemented by proper training—and military education to give 
troops greater knowledge about arms as a profession. Besides being well-trained in 
general infantry skills, soldiers will also have a proper understanding of the Rules of 
Engagement and the Law of Armed Conflict, two crucial areas for contemporary 
militaries. In addition, soldiers are better equipped for the challenges of future missions 
through training in mediation and negotiation.29  
Liddy argues that we are approaching the era of the strategic corporal because our 
soldiers are obtaining a professional mastery of warfare.30 “In military circles, the basic 
premise underlying the idea of a strategic corporal is a general belief that future 
26 Bruneau and Matei, Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations, 35. 
27 Lynda Liddy, “The Strategic Corporal: Some Requirements in Training and Education,” Australian 
Army Journal 2, no. 2 (2005): 142, http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/liddy.pdf. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 “In general many senior officers view a strategic corporal as a highly trained professional soldier 
whose competence in war fighting must be supplemented by specific areas of educational knowledge that 
permit him or her to operate effectively in multidimensional operations. The main task facing trainers and 
military educators in the early 21st century is how to best equip the individual junior leader both mentally 
and physically for the challenges of a transformed security environment. In this sense, the strategic corporal 
concept is about adapting the Army’s ethos and older values to a range of new attitudes and codes of 
behavior that today ask facing trainers and military educators.” See Liddy, “Strategic Corporal,” 147.  
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operations will be more complex in character and will require an increased level of junior 
leadership.”31 The typical modern army in the West expects its soldiers to be able to 
supervise civil affairs or assist with humanitarian aid, as well as carry out activities to 
maintain order and stability and be skilled warriors.32 As a result of these trends, it is 
recommended that the Ukrainian Army begin promoting a military culture designed to 
prepare male and female non-commissioned officers to become strategic corporals.33 
Meanwhile, the demand for women in UN and NATO operations is growing. 
“Article II of the UN Charter clearly specifies that all members shall give the United 
Nations every assistance in any action it takes.”34 As such, the Ukrainian armed forces 
must meet UN requirements to be able to provide necessary personnel when needed. 
According to UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) (UNSCR 1325), one of the 
requirements for member states is that “the international community must be sensitive to 
and take special account of women’s vulnerable situation in times of war, and UN 
member states must cooperate to involve women in peace-building and conflict-
resolution processes.”35 Furthermore, female soldiers are essential for certain tasks in 
peace operations, such as body searches of women, information gathering from other 
females, medical assistance for other women, and tasks that require getting access to the 
areas where men cannot enter.36 Women also can establish better unit relations with the 
community, support measures for good child care, monitor excessively violent behavior 
among male soldiers, and develop a better understanding of local culture.37 In light of the 
fact that the “UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) started the gradual 
31 Liddy, “Strategic Corporal,” 140. 
32 Ibid., 139.  
33 Ibid. 
34 Arturo Sotomayor, “Unintended Consequences of Peace Operations for Troop-Contributing 
Countries in South America: The Causes of Argentina and Uruguay,” in Unintended Consequences, 
Complex Peace Operations and Peacebuilding Systems, ed. Chiyuki Aoi, Cedric de Coning, and Ramesh 
Thakur (New York: United Nations Publications, 2007), 173. 
35 Anja Stegen, Peace Support Operations from a Gender Perspective (Stockholm: Edita Collins 
Printing, 2004), Foreword. 
36 Cheryl Hendricks and Lauren Hutton, Defense Reform and Gender, Gender and Security Reform 
Toolkit (Geneva: DCAF, OBSE/ODIHR, UN-INSTRAW, 2008), 3–6. 
37 Stephanie Groothedde, Gender Makes Sense: A Way to Improve Your Mission, 2nd ed. (The Hague, 
Netherlands: Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence, 2013), 16–76. 
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introduction of gender units and gender advisers into the peacekeeping operations after 
UNSCR 1325 was adopted,”38 the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense must enact changes 
that would help to expand the possibilities for women to take part in peacekeeping 
missions to be able to meet UN demands when necessary. 
NATO and its partners are taking concerted action to support implementation of 
the UNSCR.39 The alliance has recognized that “the complementary skills of both male 
and female personnel are essential for the operational effectiveness of NATO operations, 
especially in light of the increasing complexity of civil-military interaction, public 
relations and information sharing.”40 Ukraine signed the Partnership for Peace 
Framework Document with NATO in 1994,41 and afterward “actively engaged with 
NATO in terms of tangible activity and interaction within the peacekeeping sphere.”42 
And in keeping with the times, it is currently necessary to learn how to identify the 
various gender issues and how to integrate gender perspectives into all aspects of NATO 
deployment and peace support operations in accordance with UNSCR 1325. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
Despite a significant percentage of women at arms in Ukraine’s armed forces, 
they have rarely been engaged in military operations. Thus it is important to investigate 
why Ukrainian female soldiers are not actively participating in military missions. 
By scrutinizing the dominant theories arguing for or against female participation 
in military operations, this thesis is trying to determine whether the exclusion of women 
from the battlefield is justified. On the one hand is a hypothesis that supports women’s 
inclusion in the military operations. It is necessary for women at arms to take part in 
38 Gorana Odanovich, “Participation of Women in UN Peacekeeping Operations,” Western Balkans 
Security Observer 16 (January–March 2010): 74. 
39 “Women, Peace and Security,” NATO, last modified September 4, 2014, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/91057.htm. 
40 Ibid. 
41 “Signatures of Partnership for Peace Framework Document,” NATO, last modified January 10, 
2012, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_82584.htm. 
42 Greg Simons, “Ukraine’s Peacekeeping Activities: United Nations and Partnership for Peace; 
Promoting Ukraine’s Integration into European Security Cooperation” (SIPRI conference, Stockholm, 
2010), 5, http://www.sipri.org/research/security/old-pages/euroatlantic/ukraine/papers/SIPRIUkraineSimons.pdf. 
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combat actions because when females in the armed forces are not participating in the 
essential act of a soldier—fighting—they are relegated to second-class status in the 
military and in the country they represent.43 More broadly, Stephanie Groothedde argues 
that women improve the effectiveness of military missions.44 Moreover, the 
contemporary military has changed because “the immature, ultra-masculine, and 
extremely aggressive character of the ideal warrior mindset has not done the armed forces 
any favors in Iraq and Afghanistan.”45 In other words, not only do militaries need women 
but they need women more than ever now. 
An alternate hypothesis opposes women’s greater inclusion in military operations. 
Robert Egnell, for example, argues that “the overwhelming focus of integrationists has 
been the argument for equal rights rather than national security,”46 and, as a result, “the 
inclusion of women and gender perspectives will change the organization’s combat 
culture to reflect a civilian rather than a military ethos.”47 Others argue, with various 
degrees of sophistication, that women’s presence can destroy team spirit and undermine 
fighting effectiveness.48 These authors disagree about how women influence the 
effectiveness of military operations. They agree, however, that gender equality probably 
has a negative impact on a nation’s defense. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There are some assumptions in society that foster a negative attitude toward 
women’s presence in the armed forces in general. Aristotle, for example, posits that 
women cannot be courageous at all, and thus they cannot be warriors who face the real 
possibility of death in war. The other side of the tautology holds for Aristotle as well: 
43 Robert L. Maginnis, Deadly Consequences: How Cowards are Pushing Women into Combat 
(Washington, DC: Regenery Publishing, 2013), 193. 
44 Groothedde, Gender Makes Sense, 16–76. 
45 Egnell, “Women in Battle, Gender Perspectives and Fighting,” 41. 
46 Kingsley Browne, Co-ed Combat: The New Evidence that Women Shouldn’t Fight the Nation’s 
Wars (New York: Sentinel HC, 2007), 295.  
47 Egnell, “Women in Battle, Gender Perspectives and Fighting,” 33. 
48 James Haley, Women in the Military (Miami: Greenhaven Press, 2004), 7. 
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because women have never fought in wars, they cannot be brave.49 According to 
Aristotle, experience marks a key factor that women lack to become courageous. 
There are, however, many examples in history about the brave acts displayed by 
women during different wars, including some notable Ukrainian women warriors. During 
World War II, for example, a Ukrainian woman, Nadezhda Popova (1921–2013), flew a 
flimsy 1920s two-seat biplane, which had no parachutes, guns, radar, or radio. Using 
maps and compasses for navigation, she flew 852 missions in total, including 18 in a 
single night. She was given the highest honor and named a Hero of the Soviet Union,50 
proving to the world that women could no longer be considered as lacking courage. 
Popova is not the only example of women’s valor in combat. Female snipers are also well 
known in history, including Ukrainian Lyudmila Pavlichenko, who killed 309 German 
soldiers during the war. She has been recognized as the most successful woman sniper in 
history.51  
Ukrainian women were also commanders of tanks. Aleksandra Samusenko, for 
example, was commander of a T-34 tank during World War II. Her tank crew defeated 
three German Tiger I tanks, for which she received the Order of the Red Star. For her 
overall bravery, she was awarded the Order of the Patriotic War 1st class.52 
Indeed, despite Aristotle’s somewhat stylized musings, women have always 
fought and died in various wars. “They have led men in battle, been prisoners of war, 
fired lethal weapons, and operated our most sophisticated systems. They fly combat 
aircraft and serve on combat ships. Women meet the military's physical and mental 
standards, are technically proficient, and are highly trained war fighters and leaders.”53 
49 Lawrence M. Hinman, Ethics: A Pluralist Approach to Moral Theory (Boston: Wadsworth, 2013), 
263. 
50 “The ‘Night Witch’ Who Bombed the Nazis,” The Week, July 26, 2013, 35. 
51 Pat Farey and Mark Spicer, Sniping: An Illustrated History (Minneapolis, MN: Zenith Press, 2009), 
129.  
52 V. S. Murmantseva, “Soviet Women in the Great Patriotic War,” accessed September 15, 2013, 
http://www.a-z.ru/women/texts/murman1r-13.htm. 
53 “Should Women Be Allowed in Combat?,” Scholastic, accessed September 15, 2013, 
http://teacher.scholastic.com/scholasticnews/indepth/upfront/debate/index.asp?article=0905. 
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As Alma Persson notes, “for centuries women have played a vital (yet unrecognized) part 
in the military.”54 
The lack of recognition is not surprising, because many conservative theorists 
oppose women’s presence in the military operations. James Haley, for example, states 
that “the gender integration of the infantry and other ground combat units would 
significantly undermine the capability and readiness of the … military.”55  
As a solution, Adam N. Wojack identifies equal treatment of both genders in the 
armed forces as vital for the military effectiveness. He posits that “as long as women are 
treated fairly and equally and men do not perceive them as receiving special treatment, 
there is no reason why men and women cannot bond to form effective combat units.”56 
King also argues that it is important to understand that the armed forces are focused on 
war-winning, not on employment equality, and that women’s integration in the all-
volunteer professional forces should be judged purely by an individual’s competence. 
Thus, military positions should be filled on the basis solely of qualifications rather than 
on gender.57  
The inclusion of women in the military is not just a matter of fairness, however; it 
may also provide key benefits. Robert Egnell, Kingsley Browne, Lorry M. Fenner, Marie 
E. deYoung, and Lester L. Lyles all argue that women bring something special to the 
operation that is not connected to physical strength. These scholars emphasize that 
qualities unrelated to physical strength bring effectiveness to military missions. Fenner 
and deYoung write that “a team is made up of individuals. To be successful, the sum of 
their efforts must be greater than their individual efforts. Team members should not all be 
the same size and have the same skills if the team is to be successful.”58 Scholars and 
54 Alma Persson, Changing Boundaries, Defending Boundaries: Gender Relations in the Swedish 
Armed Forces (Linkoping, Sweden: LiU-Tryck, 2011), 29. 
55 Haley, Women in the Military, 7. 
56 Adam N. Wojack, “Women Can Be Integrated into Ground Combat Units,” Military Review, 
November/December 2002, quoted in Haley, Women in the Military, 27. 
57 Anthony King, “Women in Battle: The Female Soldier,” Parameters 43, no. 2 (2013): 13. 
58 Lorry M. Fenner and Marie E. deYoung, Women in Combat: Civic Duty or Military Liability? 
(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2001), 17. 
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policymakers, however, have not yet reached similar conclusions on the best way to 
utilize women at arms according to gender differences. 
For one thing, the types of military engagement have also changed in the last few 
decades. Contemporary military operations include stability operations, peace operations, 
counterinsurgency, and irregular and asymmetric wars. These wars “involve a multitude 
of actors fighting for the hearts and minds of the local, as well as global, population 
whose perceptions of the conflict often determine the outcome.”59 Thus, it is not 
currently clear whether force or cognitive skills have a greater impact on military 
missions. 
Ellen Haring posits that women’s presence can actually strengthen every 
organization. Haring argues that there are clear links between organizational success and 
the number of females in the most successful organizations. Women improve quality and 
scope of decision-making. In addition, “well-trained women could become … greatest 
source of asymmetric [unconventional] combat power [in the fight against terrorism].”60 
Female soldiers can gather information from other women, improve the unit’s relations 
with the community, develop better understanding of local culture, and get access to the 
areas where men cannot enter.61 According to the Executive Summary of From 
Representation to Inclusion: Diversity Leadership for the 21st-Century Military, “joint 
operations have demonstrated that a seamless integration of differences can be 
accomplished and can positively influence the outcome of the fight.”62 
According to Cheryl Hendricks and Lauren Hutton, gender integration brings 
experience, knowledge, and the interests of men and women to armed operations—which 
can make a crucial difference. Hendricks and Hutton highlight the necessity to respond to 
different security needs that are gender-sensitive within society (such as gender-based 
violence), the necessity to respond to the changing nature and needs of the defense sector, 
59 Fenner and deYoung, Women in Combat, 37. 
60 Wojack, “Women Can Be Integrated,” quoted in Haley, Women in the Military, 32. 
61 Egnell, “Women in Battle, Gender Perspectives and Fighting,” 33–41. 
62 Military Leadership Diversity Commission, From Representation to Inclusion: Diversity 
Leadership for the 21st-Century Military (Arlington, VA: Military Leadership Diversity Commission, 
2011), 15. 
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the need to improve operational effectiveness, create representative defense forces, and 
strengthen democratic, civil oversight of the defense forces. The authors state that gender 
mainstreaming enables the defense sector to better perform peacekeeping tasks. 
Hendricks and Hutton argue that female peacekeepers can increase the effectiveness of 
peacekeeping missions because women can perform body searches on women, are more 
approachable and trustworthy, can gather information from other females and from local 
women’s organizations, and can provide a positive image of women in the military for 
local women to join security or armed forces. Furthermore, women serve as monitors of 
excessively violent behavior among male soldiers.63 
Stephanie Groothedde states that women play a very valuable role in post-conflict 
peace-building. According to Groothedde, gender mainstreaming will make operations 
more effective and sustainable because, to see a full picture of an operation, there is a 
need for participation by both genders in the process of peace-building. For example, 
“safety” means “no more fighting” to men, but for women it means “more personal 
protection and good child care.” Female peacekeepers support measures that help provide 
access to water, markets, clinics, and schools. Furthermore, the author points out that 
there is a need for the presence of women at higher levels and command positions to be 
able to participate in the decision-making process and bring about necessary changes.64 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
A comparative approach is used in this thesis. Ukraine’s experience in the 
utilization of women at arms is compared with the experiences of NATO and UN 
member-states’ militaries, including the United States and other allied nations. The thesis 
focuses on the lessons learned from female military personnel taking part in UN and 
NATO peacekeeping operations. Moreover, such topics as what women bring to the UN 
and NATO missions and how professionalization increases thanks to women’s 
participation in military operations are investigated in this work. 
63 Hendricks and Hutton, Defense Reform and Gender, 3–6. 
64 Groothedde, Gender Makes Sense, 16–76. 
 14 
                                                 
The sources outlined in the literature review section are augmented with public 
documents on policy or laws from the governments of Ukraine and the United States. 
Statistical data is gained from the World Bank, UN, and NATO. This thesis contains 
information from newspaper articles, scholarly journals, policy papers, and government 
reports, as well as books related to the topic of women’s integration into the military.   
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The thesis begins by taking a closer look at the debates surrounding female 
soldiers’ participation in military operations. Arguments both for and against integration 
of women in armed forces are studied. Theories about professionalization of the military 
and effective use of force and methods to create effective military units with gender 
integration are also researched. The thesis continues by assessing the current state of 
women at arms in the Ukrainian armed forces (including identification of the problems 
that the Ukrainian military have today, and changes that are coming or need to come 
through) followed by an examination of the utilization of women in armed forces. 
Experiences and lessons learned from other militaries, which utilize females in military 
operations and have a vast amount of work regarding to this topic, are investigated. The 
research attempts to determine the overall effectiveness of the utilization of women at 
arms in military operations. 
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II. WOMEN AT ARMS AS A CIVIL-MILITARY ISSUE AND AS A 
FUNCTION OF LIBERALIZATION/DEMOCRATIZATION 
The decision to integrate women fully into the armed forces often is met with 
opposition. There are plenty of controversial theories that often are used to justify 
women’s exclusion from the military. Some view the integration of women in the 
military as a misguided decision that would harm combat effectiveness. Others identify 
the integration of women into the armed forces as necessary for strengthening civilian 
control over the military and enhancing professionalization and effectiveness of the 
military. Thus, scholars disagree about the question of how women are influencing 
military organizations.  
Though, to many, it sounds like an oxymoron, the term “military 
humanitarianism” has come into increasingly common use.65 Thus, “the very missions of 
the military shift from primary war fighting or war deterrence to military deployments for 
peace and humanitarian purposes.”66 War fighting is very different from peace support 
operations. According to Don Kraus, Robert A. Enholm and Amanda J. Bowen, 
“peacekeepers require a daunting range of skills: they must be combat capable but also 
skilled negotiators and mediators; they need general knowledge of the U.N. system, 
mandates, and rules of engagement but also an understanding of civil-military 
cooperation to effectively interact with humanitarian agencies and local populations; and 
they require mission-specific knowledge of local politics, history, customs, culture, 
language, and conflict dynamics as well as more general skills to protect civilians from 
imminent violence.”67  
Knowing that today’s wars are very different, the forces that wage them should be 
different, as well. Moreover, the capacities of the soldiers, which are necessary for 
65 Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams, and David R. Segal, The Postmodern Military: Armed 
Forces after the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 3. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Don Kraus, Robert A. Enholm, and Amanda J. Bowen, U.S. Engagement in International 
Peacekeeping: From Aspiration to Implementation (Washington, DC: Citizens for Global Solutions 
Education Fund, 2011), 53, http://globalsolutions.org/files/public/documents/U.S.-Engagement-in-International-
Peacekeeping.pdf. 
 17 
                                                 
military effectiveness, have also changed to comply with the new types of missions. The 
question remains―do female soldiers have different abilities and capacities from men? If 
so, may these women’s capacities enhance effectiveness of the armed forces and bring 
success to the contemporary military missions? 
A. THE MODERN VERSUS THE POSTMODERN MILITARY 
The fact is that, very often, the role of women is considered to be extremely 
limited in an institutional type of military organization. However, “the shift toward more 
occupational and especially postmodern patterns is supposedly associated with expanding 
employment opportunities for women.”68 The U.S. armed forces, as well as those of the 
developed democracies of other Western states, are transitioning away from the modern 
military organization toward a postmodern form.69  
The modern military emerged in the nineteenth century and was associated with 
the development of the nation-state. The basic format of the modern military “was a 
combination of conscripted lower ranks of militia and professional officer corps, war-
oriented in mission, masculine in makeup and ethos, and sharply differentiated in 
structure and culture from civilian society.”70 The postmodern military, however, 
“undergoes loosening of the ties with the nation-state. The basic format shifts toward a 
volunteer force, more multipurpose in mission, increasingly androgynous in makeup and 
ethos, and with greater permeability with civilian society.”71 To understand why the 
postmodern military creates equal opportunities for women as well as men in the military, 
it is necessary to examine how the presence of woman at arms actually influences armed 
forces. 
One of the five major organizational changes that shape the character of the 
postmodern military is the structural and cultural interpenetrability of the civilian and 
68 Helena Carreiras, Gender and the Military: Women in the Armed Forces of Western Democracies 
(New York: Routledge, 2006), 84 
69 Charles C. Moskos identifies three stages of armed forces and society: Modern, Late Modern, and 




                                                 
military spheres.72 Thomas Bruneau and Cristiana Matei explain how governments can 
develop strong civil-military relations (CMR). They identify three dimensions of 
CMR―control, effectiveness, and efficiency.73 Control is important because civilian 
control over the military is a basis for liberal democracy.74 Peter D. Feaver maintains that 
“because we fear others we create an institution of violence to protect us, but then we fear 
the very institution we created for protection.”75 Indeed, the civilian and military worlds 
are very different from one another, and equilibrium amid civilian control and military 
effectiveness is necessary,76 because the lack of civilian control over the military may 
result in a creation of a state within a state or lead to a military dictatorship, and lack of 
military effectiveness may lead to the failure of the state to be able to protect its society. 
Matei argues that “the challenge in the contemporary world is not to assert and maintain 
civilian control over the military but also to develop effective militaries, police forces, 
and intelligence agencies that are able to implement a broad variety of roles and 
missions.”77 If, however, the presence of women at arms in the military can influence at 
least two indicators of CMR―control and effectiveness (improving civilian control over 
military and enhancing military effectiveness), the acceptance of the female soldiers into 
armed forces can be justified as beneficial.  
72 “The Postmodern military is characterized by five major organizational changes. One is the 
increasing interpenetrability of civilian and military spheres, both structurally and culturally. The second is 
the diminution of differences within the armed services based on branch of service, rank, and combat 
versus support roles. The third is the change in the military purpose from fighting wars to missions that 
would not be considered military in the traditional sense. The fourth change is that the military forces are 
used more in international missions authorized (or at least legitimated) by entities beyond the nation state. 
A final change is the internationalization of military forces themselves. Here we have in mind the 
emergence of the Eurocorps, and multinational and binational divisions in NATO countries.” Moskos, 
Williams, and Segal, Postmodern Military, 2. 
73 Bruneau and Matei, Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations, 30. 
74 “Civilian Control of the Armed Forces,” UK Essays, accessed May 22, 2014, 
http://www.ukessays.com/essays/politics/civilian-control-of-the-armed-forces-politics-essay.php. 
75 Peter D. Feaver, “The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz and the Question of 
Civilian Control,” Armed Forces and Society 23, no. 2 (1996): 149–78. 
76 “Civilian Control of the Armed Forces.”  
77 Bruneau and Matei, Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations, 29. 
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B. WHAT WOMEN BRING TO CIVILIAN CONTROL OVER MILITARY 
Women are a part of society that has historically been shut out of military 
institutions. The presence of women in the armed forces, however, would help pass the 
norms and expectations of the society onto the armed forces, and thus, strengthen civilian 
control over the military.78  
This concept is better explained by one of the primary theorists in civil-military 
relations. Samuel P. Huntington, in his book, The Soldier and the State, described the 
differences between the military and civilian worlds. The two worlds consist of different 
institutions with opposing norms and rules. The military world is conservative (illiberal) 
by its nature. Thus, it is necessary to find methods of ensuring that the liberal civilian 
world keeps control over the military world.79  
According to Huntington, civilian control over the military has two imperatives: 
functional and societal. Societal imperative consists of two components: ideology (a 
world-view, which can be anti-military—liberal, Marxist—or pro-military—
conservative, fascist) and structure (the legal-constitutional framework).80 The functional 
imperative is the objective requirements of warfare.81 The widespread but wrong 
assumption is that “the existing military structure and culture are already well adapted to 
perform excellence in war; that the military organization looks like it does because of the 
… functional imperative of the armed forces.”82 Huntington argues that “if the armed 
forces reflect only social values and societal culture, it is likely to be incapable of 
performing its military function. On the other hand, if it is shaped only by functional 
imperatives, it could become impossible to contain within the society it is supposed to 
78 Morris Janowitz, “The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait,” Journal of Politics 23, 
no. 1 (1961): 176–78; and Morris Janowitz, “The Social Demography of the All-Volunteer Force,” Annals 
of the American Academy of Political Science 406 (March 1973): 86–93. 
79 Huntington, Soldier and the State, 11–151. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Egnell, “Women in Battle, Gender Perspectives and Fighting,” 34. 
82 Ibid. 
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protect.”83 The solution is not to attempt to balance between the two imperatives, but 
rather to seek synergies.84  
Morris Janowitz came up with a theory to assist in the search for synergies 
between functional and societal imperatives and to eventually gain greater civilian 
control over the military, which is a prerequisite for the development of a democratic 
government.85 Janowitz agrees with Huntington that the military is different from the 
civilian world, but his theory about ways to reduce the danger to liberal society is 
different from Hungtington’s. Janowitz sees the military world as fundamentally 
conservative, and thus not able to adapt to changes as rapidly as many open civilian 
societies. Therefore, according to Janowitz, the military would benefit from an outside 
intervention.86  
Janowitz introduced a theory of convergence. According to this theory, clashes 
between the military and civilian world will eventually occur because of the essential 
differences that these two worlds have. Thus, he came to the conclusion that convergence 
of the two worlds can be the solution that will help to diminish differences because it will 
ensure that the norms and expectations of the society will be passed on to the military. 
Janowitz encouraged bringing different people in the officer corps in order for the 
military to be made up from those who represent the diverse nature of society. With this 
societal diversity within the military accomplished, the attitudes between the military and 
civilian world will be more closely aligned. Consequently, the civilians will gain greater 
control over the military.87  
His theory can be applied to the presence of women in the armed forces. 
Janowitz’s theory suggested including the diverse nature of society into the military to 
reduce tensions between the civilian and military world. Women represent one-half of 
83 Egnell, “Women in Battle, Gender Perspectives and Fighting,” 39. 
84 Ibid. 
85 “Civilian Control of the Armed Forces.” 
86 Janowitz, “The Professional Soldier,” 176–78; and Janowitz, “Social Demography,” 86–93. 
87 Ibid. 
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society, and as such, represent the values and culture of the half of population.  Thus, 
they bring liberal societal attitudes into the armed forces and, consequently, strengthen 
civilian control over the military.88  
There are a few possible straightforward avenues in which women at arms can 
contribute to civilian control over the military. Matei argues that there are three sets of 
mechanisms utilized by civilians to exercise control over the military. They are: 
institutional control mechanisms, oversight, and the inculcation of professional norms.89 
“Institutional control mechanisms involve providing direction and guidance for the 
security forces, exercised through institutions that range from organic laws and other 
regulations that empower the civilian leadership, to civilian-led organizations with 
professional staffs.”90 Some examples of such civilian-led organizations with 
professional staffs are: the ministry of defense, “one or more comities in the legislature 
that deal with policies and budgets, and a well-defined chain of authority for civilians to 
determine roles and missions, such as a National Security Council-type organization.”91 
One possible way for women at arms to contribute to control is, after retiring from their 
military service, to become ministers of defense or members of the parliamentary 
committees on defense. Thus, they will be able to address problems and needs of half of 
the population (women) and combine the military “institutional knowledge” with 
“civilian” elements. 
A second mechanism that civilians may utilize is oversight. According to Matei, 
“oversight is exercised on a regular legal basis by the civilian leadership to keep track of 
what the security forces do, and to ensure they are in fact following the direction and 
guidance they have received from the civilian chain of command.”92 Oversight can be 
exercised by formal agencies within the three main branches of the government 
88 Janowitz, “The Professional Soldier,” 176–78; and Janowitz, “Social Demography,” 86–93. 





                                                 
(legislative, executive, and judicial), think tanks, independent media, NGOs, and some of 
the international organizations.93 Thus, retired women at arms can become members of 
the judicial branch or journalists covering the armed forces and therefore contribute to 
control and combine military “institutional knowledge” with “civilian” elements. 
Utilization of the professional norms is the third mechanism that, according to 
Matei, civilians use to exercise control over the military. “Professional norms are 
institutionalized through legally approved and transparent policies for recruitment, 
education, training, and promotion, in accordance with the goals of the democratically 
elected civilian leadership, thus internalizing the previous two control mechanisms.”94 
Consequently, women at arms may contribute to control by, after retirement, becoming 
professors at National Defense Universities, where their work will contribute to the 
creation of professional norms (professional norms can also improve military 
effectiveness).95  
C. WHAT WOMEN BRING TO EFFECTIVENESS  
According to the citizen-soldier tradition favored by Janowitz and his followers, 
“as democratic citizens, women are the civic equals of men.”96 Thus, women should be 
able to serve in the military as well as men do, because an obligation of every citizen is to 
protect their country against forces, “foreign or domestic, that threaten to undermine its 
democratic values.”97 Very often, however, democracy is “understood more in terms of 
individual rights and freedom of choice, and less in terms of the shared responsibilities of 
civic republican citizenship.”98 R. Claire Snyder posits that “the citizen-soldier has been 
and remains an important one because it is one of the few areas that recognize the 
93 Bruneau and Matei, Routledge Handbook of Civil-military Relations, 31. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid., 30. 
96 R. Claire Snyder, “The Citizen-Soldier Tradition and Gender Integration of the U.S. Military,” 
Armed Forces and Society 29, no. 185 (2003): 186. 
97 Snyder, “The Citizen-Soldier Tradition,” 186. 
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military as a central problem for democratic society.”99 Therefore, it is vital to study and 
evaluate changes in terms of their effect on democratic values as well as their impact on 
military effectiveness. 100 
Female inclusion in the military can be justified as willingness by the country to 
sustain and protect its democratic values, including gender equality. At the same time, 
effectiveness is a necessary requirement for the protection of the democratic society, and 
“it would make no sense to allow a one-track focus on the individual rights of women to 
serve in any capacity they choose to undermine military effectiveness.”101 Ideally, the 
military should both protect democratic society and help sustain democratic values.102 
However, between choosing to either ensure military effectiveness or extend women’s 
rights, the reasonable decision would be to choose effectiveness, unless women bring 
something unique to the military, which actually helps to maximize military 
effectiveness.103  
Thomas C. Bruneau argues that there are six major roles for contemporary 
security forces: fight, and be prepared to fight external wars, internal wars or 
insurgencies, global terrorism, internal and external crime, and maintain the ability to 
provide support for humanitarian assistance, and to be prepared for and take part in peace 
support operations.104 The effectiveness of the security forces is best determined by 
whether or not a state is prepared to fulfill any or all of the six allotted roles for 
contemporary security forces.105 One of the three basic requirements for militaries to be 
effective in fulfilling any of the six roles and missions is that country must commit 
99 Snyder, “The Citizen-Soldier Tradition,” 189. 
100 Ibid., 199. 
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resources―money, personnel, equipment, and so forth.106 Women constitute half of the 
population and thus can add to the numerical representation of the military forces. 
Moreover, “the accelerated integration of computer-age technologies into weapon system 
and military command and control networks … carries the promise of greater military 
agility, precision, and potency, but it also requires large force reduction to finance the 
new technology.”107 Those countries who abolish conscription while trying to switch to 
the small, professional army also should consider allowing more women in their armed 
forces because when it comes to the ability to operate new technologies intelligence 
matters more than brawn. 
 Indeed, women have usually been needed in the military when countries faced 
recruitment difficulties while trying to enlarge their armed forces.108 When, for instance, 
in some countries the military life became less attractive to young men, because the 
armed forces suffered from a crisis of legitimacy, inclusion of women in the armed forces 
actually increased the number of personnel at lower costs, due to the gender differences 
in the labor market.109 Thus, nations considering a transition from conscription to a 
volunteer system, for example, usually were content “to include plans to expand women’s 
military participation.”110  
The presence of women in the armed forces tends to help a country not only to 
maintain an all-volunteer army, but also to professionalize the military. Helena Carreiras 
claims that according to empirical research, the armed forces of Western countries 
increased the number of women in their ranks when they abolished conscription; and a 
106 Three basic requirements for the security forces to be effective when fulfilling any of the six roles 
and missions are: first―there should be a plan (strategy, doctrine); second―”there must be structures and 
processes to both formulate the plans and implement them,” and third―countries must provide enough 
resources (political capital, money, personnel, equipment, trained forces, etc.) Bruneau and Matei, 
Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations, 32. 
107 Moskos, Williams, and Segal, Postmodern Military, 5. 
108 Emmanuel Reynaud, “Reynaud, Emmanuel. “Women, Violence and the Army,” Foreign Policy 
53, no. 3 (1988), quoted in Helena Carreiras, “The Role of Women in the Armed Forces of NATO 
Countries: Military Constraints and Professional Identities,” Minerva: Quarterly Report on Women and the 
Military 17, no. 3–4 (1999): 5. 
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relation was found between the higher number of accepted women and “the degree of 
specialization of the armed services (namely, the growing need for qualified personnel to 
fulfill new technically demanding functions).”111 Early research into the U.S. armed 
forces has uncovered that the country has met its expectations for raising force 
qualification. According to Carreiras, “the presence of women has promoted an increase 
in educational levels, as women who volunteered for the armed forces were on average 
better educated than men.”112 In the U.S. all-volunteer military, recruits who fail to finish 
their high school education “are expected to meet higher standards than graduates in the 
battery of tests given to prospective results.”113 Martin Binkin and Shirley J. Bach argue 
that “because the services have stipulated smaller quantitative goals for women, they 
have been able to be more selective and a far larger proportion of women than men have 
been high school graduates.”114 When compared to the all-volunteer military, educational 
level “is not normally included among the specific qualifications identified for enlisted 
positions.”115 The ability of the United States to maintain an all-volunteer army “has 
even been considered to depend on the effective use of the female labor force.”116  
By virtue of their better education, women actually help to professionalize the 
military. According to Samuel P. Huntington, “the distinguishing characteristics of a 
profession as a special type of vocation are its expertise, responsibility, and 
corporateness.”117 Military expertise includes education as a requirement of 
111 Carreiras, Gender and the Military, 84. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Martin Binkin and Shirley J. Bach, Women and the Military (Washington, DC: The Brookings 
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professionalization.118 Huntington states that professional education of professional men 
consists of two phases: “the first imparting a broad, liberal, cultural background, and the 
second imparting the specialized skills and knowledge of the profession. The liberal 
education of the professional man is normally handled by the general education 
institutions of society devoted to this purpose. The second or technical phase of 
professional education, on the other hand, is given in special institutions operated by or 
affiliated with the profession itself.”119 Huntington posits that the skill of the officer is 
incredibly complex, as it is “neither a craft (which is primarily mechanical) nor an art 
(which requires unique and nontransferable talent).”120 Modern officer requirements 
include extensive study and training, translating to roughly one-third of his or her 
professional life spent in formal schooling.121 
Huntington argues that the modern professional officer should have a general 
education, in addition to a military education. This is because the military officer must be 
familiar with a vast array of other subjects, including history, politics, economics, 
sociology, and psychology, in addition to natural sciences, including chemistry, physics, 
and biology. Military officers with a solid understanding of the relationship between 
military duties and these supplementary areas of knowledge will be best prepared for the 
challenges they might face. Additionally, a military officer “cannot really develop his 
analytical skill, insight, imagination, and judgment if he is trained simply in vocational 
duties. The abilities and habits of mind which he requires within his professional field 
can in large part be acquired only through the broader avenues of learning outside his 
profession.”122  
118 “Professional expertise also has a dimension in breadth which is lacking in the normal trade. It is a 
segment of the total cultural tradition of society. The professional man can successfully apply his skill only 
when he is aware of this broader tradition of which he is a part. Learned professions are ‘learned’ simply 
because they are an integral part of the total body of learning of society. Consequently, professional 
education consists of two phases: the first imparting a broad, liberal, cultural background, and the second 
imparting the specialized skills and knowledge of the profession.” Huntington, Soldier and the State, 7. 
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The necessary understanding of human attitudes, behaviors, and motivations 
required for the modern officer can be attained through the pursuit of a liberal education. 
This observation supports Helena Carreiras’s argument that because those women who 
volunteered for the armed forces tend to be better educated than men123 (they received 
higher education from a liberal educational institution prior to joining the armed forces, 
required, as Huntington states, for the first phase of professional education), the presence 
of women increased the educational levels in the military and, thus, helped to 
professionalize the military. 
Moreover, the presence of women in the military tends to reduce disciplinary 
problems. As mentioned above, women who volunteer to join the military are more likely 
to be better educated when compared to their male counterparts. As research has 
indicated, higher levels of education result in fewer disciplinary problems, since people 
who dropped out of high school may have a harder time adapting to the rigors of a 
demanding military environment.124 Also, regarding military disciplinary issues, women 
have been known to serve as monitors of excessive behavior among male soldiers. 
Servicewomen may observe male peacekeepers’ actions and report violations. Such 
measures are necessary because “the presence of peace-keeping troops contributes to 
increasing the incidence of prostitution and sexual slavery.”125  
Furthermore, it has been empirically demonstrated that women at arms play a 
valuable role in civil-military operations, because they can reach elements of society that 
men cannot; and they can provide medical care and humanitarian aid, which is very 
important for winning the hearts and minds of a fragmented population and thus bringing 
success to the missions.126 Some question whether women who participate in 
peacekeeping operations should be military or civilians. It is necessary, however, to 
mention that civil servants who are engaged in military operations should possess the 
123 Carreiras, Gender and the Military, 84.  
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same physical fitness levels as the military, because there have been instances when 
interpreters could not physically fulfill required tasks, such as the ability to move quickly 
when necessary. For example, during one mission, a linguist assisting the military took a 
break after every 15 minutes of walking due to his medical conditions and age. Thus, the 
military, which depended on the services of the linguist, could not move quickly enough 
to achieve their stated mission goals.127 Such recruitment of civilians can sometimes 
cause damage to the overall effectiveness of the mission.  
Another important issue is that female military personnel sometimes receive 
inadequate civil-military relations training before being deployed and funds are often 
unavailable for projects that eventually could be beneficial to the local population. “To 
presume that a group with little training, little experience in other cultures, and no 
enduring presence can change social dynamics in a place like Afghanistan is arrogant and 
absurd.”128 Thus, women at arms have to be properly prepared for their missions, and 
ways to properly fund projects necessary for the success of the mission should be found. 
“More focus should be put on employing qualified civilians or military Civil Affairs 
units.”129 Furthermore, civil-military programs should have sufficient amounts of officers 
above the rank of Lieutenant, which represent critical leadership to define goals and 
shape team tactics.130  
Moreover, it is quite necessary for the military to learn to cooperate with other 
important actors in the area, such as humanitarian and civilian organizations. Eventually, 
that would be beneficial for them all because this will reduce the duplication of effort, 
waste of assets, and so forth.131 Time and again, peacekeeping efforts in places such as 
127 Matt Pottinger, Hli Jilani, and Clire Russo, “Half-Hearted: Trying to Win Afghanistan without 
Afghan Women,” Small Wars Journal, 2010, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/370-
pottinger.pdf. 
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Afghanistan and Iraq have proven that the military needs to have a more effective 
partnership with interagency and civilian development actors.132  
As a matter of fact, female liaison officers may be more adept at fostering 
cooperation between humanitarian organizations and the military.133 According to 
Egnell, “male dominance of the military has been pointed to as one of the cultural 
features that create friction between military and humanitarian organizations.”134 Major 
goals of humanitarian organizations are to save lives, alleviate suffering, and promote 
compliance with international law. This agenda requires “sustained interaction and 
dialogue by humanitarian actors with international military and peacekeeping forces. 
Such dialogue may involve raising awareness of the specific obligations of the forces 
concerned under international law and alerting them to the impact of their operations on 
civilians.”135 Lyla Hoffman argues that women typically are more cooperative, tolerant, 
caring, and kind by their social conditioning, while men are more competitive and 
aggressive.136 Because women are seen as more approachable, they are also seen as 
better interlocutors with humanitarian actors, and they release other regular soldiers for 
more traditional military duties.137 
Indeed, research conducted by Anita Woolley and Thomas Malone concluded that 
women are often better at reading the emotions of other people, and well-suited to work 
in a collaborative environment. According to their research, “the ability to perceive and 
sense emotional changes leads to more collaborative patterns of group behavior and 
132 Long, “Effectiveness of U.S. Military Female Engagement Teams,” 35. 
133 Egnell, “Women in Battle, Gender Perspectives and Fighting,” 40. 
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Military: Opposing Viewpoints (St. Paul, MN: Greenhaven Press, 1983), 79–85  
137 Donna Bridges and Debbie Horsfall, “Increasing Operational Effectiveness in UN Peacekeeping: 
Toward a Gender-Balanced Force,” Armed Forces and Society 36, no. 1 (2009): 127. 
 30 
                                                 
women tend to score higher than men in this category.”138 The study also demonstrated 
that groups dominated by only men or only women are “collectively less intelligent than 
groups where communication is evenly shared [between both genders].”139 There is a 
link between the organizational success and the number of women in the organizations. 
The U.S. Catalyst Information Center that tracks different studies, for example, 
concluded that most of the studies reveal that “companies with the most women board 
directors, especially those with three or more women board directors, had better financial 
performance than those with the least women board directors.”140 Thus, to enhance a 
team’s collective intelligence and improve executive-level decisions, it is necessary to 
include the second half of the population that is underutilized.141  
Fenner and deYoung argue that diversity within a team is a crucial element of 
success, each individual brings his or her own contribution to the completion of the 
task.142 Lester L. Lyles claims that “current and future challenges can be better met by 
broadening our understanding of diversity and by effectively leading our uniformed men 
and women in ways that fully leverage their differences.”143 
D. THE DEBATE ABOUT WOMEN’S INTEGRATION INTO THE ARMED 
FORCES 
Sexual integration of combat forces very often is seen by adversaries of women in 
the military as change that is “posing a significant threat to national security.”144 First of 
all, they argue that the inclusion of females in the armed forces may create a segment of 
the military that is physically weaker and that women’s mental capabilities put the 
138 Anita Woolley and Thomas Malone, “Defend Your Research: What Makes a Team Smarter? More 
Women,” Harvard Business Review, June 2011, quoted in Ellen L. Haring, “Women in Battle, What 
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140 “Why Diversity Matters,” Catalyst Knowledge Center, last modified July 27, 2012, 
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success of all missions at risk when it comes to combat actions.145 Many still view 
female exclusion from the infantry as appropriate, if not necessary, due to the perception 
that women have physiological limitations.146 The proponents of women in the military, 
however, claim that the arguments against women’s integration into the armed forces 
have very little empirical support and are based on flawed assumptions. The arguments 
against integration rely on an expression of the gender roles that were established in the 
society a long time ago and are no longer relevant.147  
Adversaries of women in the military also posit that women are “less physically 
aggressive, able to withstand less pain, less willing to take physical risks, less motivated 
to kill.”148 The proponents of women in the military, however, claim that “aggressiveness 
and suitability for military service are learned social skills, they are not something one is 
born with.”149 Moreover, even though the United States, for example, has been involved 
in two major recent wars, “seventy-five percent of American soldiers currently do not fill 
combat positions, yet they execute vitally important military functions.”150 This example 
also translates to the military forces of other nations, which have not been engaged in the 
same level of combat operations.  
Women are, indeed, more controlled than men in managing violence. Men are 
competitive by nature, and aggressiveness tends to escalate between men in a strongly 
male-dominated situation. Donna Winslow’s research about Canadian units in a mission 
in Somalia concludes that hyper-masculinity of the troops resulted in a rise of violence 
145 Browne, Co-ed Combat, 291. 
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and criminal acts.151 Aggressiveness is less common when women are present because 
their influence reduces hyper-masculinity.152 
Furthermore, adversaries of women in the military argue that women are less 
suited to war because their deaths are seen by society as more disturbing than men’s 
deaths. Experiences showed, however, that fatalities among female personnel in the 
armed forces in some countries, such as the United States, for instance, are perceived by 
the society in the same way as fatalities among male personnel.153  
Additionally, the adversaries of women in the military also state that the groups 
where females are added “become less disciplined and more subject to conflict related to 
sexual jealousy and sexual frustration.”154 The cases about harassment, bullying, and 
sexual abuse may be seen as validation that the integration of women into the armed 
forces has damaged the foundations of military discipline; in short, that women are to 
blame for the negative reaction of their male colleagues. The proponents of women in the 
military, however, claim that the problem with harassment, bullying, and sexual abuse 
itself is a lack of discipline and legislation.155 Anthony King, for instance, writes: “The 
recognition of these discriminatory processes does not justify them nor can it be used as 
evidence that women should be excluded no more than the existence of racism in the US 
Army in the 1940s and 1950s was a legitimate reason for excluding black American 
soldiers from combat units. Yet these cultural realities are likely to complicate the 
accession of women into the infantry.”156 
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E. PHYSICAL REALITIES 
Women’s bodies and physicality stand out as long-standing and prominent 
concerns. Kingsley Browne argues that women are not as physically strong as men and 
thus can face problems in performing necessary functions on the battlefield. Such authors 
and scholars as Rosemarie Skaine, Anthony King, and Michael J. Frevola argue that 
physical strength is necessary for military organizations and that females should achieve 
the same athletic standards as their male peers and should be treated equally to men to 
form an effective combat unit.157 Frevola also emphasizes that physical requirements 
should be the same for both genders and decided by position, rather than by gender.158 
Equal physical requirements will undercut the argument that women are unqualified to be 
soldiers.159 Ellen Haring argues that many women can meet the physical standards 
required by the military, and thus athletic fitness is not a problem at all.160  
Research from the United States reveals that “over 52 percent of female cadets, 
albeit a select group, passed the Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT) using the male 
standards. In short, a percentage of women are just as physically capable as men.”161 
Moreover, the evidence collected from the American operations in Iraq and Afghanistan 
indicate that women can successfully perform in tasks required for infantry soldiers. MAJ 
Kellie McCoy, an engineer platoon leader, for instance, twice ran through enemy fire to 
rescue wounded soldiers in Iraq. She received the Bronze Star with Valor. SGT Julia 
Bringloe rescued or recovered eleven wounded or killed soldiers during a particularly 
daunting 40-hour period. She was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross. SSG Jessica 
Packard from the U.S. Air Force “scored the fastest course time of both sexes in the 2009 
Firefighter Combat Challenge which included carrying a 175-pound victim while wearing 
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full bunker gear.”162 Consequently, it is very possible that women can perform well 
physically if they receive proper training.  
Judith Stiehm’s research showed that with proper training women can become 
stronger and be able to pass physical requirements.163 According to Stiehm, empirical 
data from military academies proved that women had some dramatic changes in their 
physical performance. For instance, their capacity to do pushups had increased by 46 
percent for the researched period to comply with the physical standards. This change 
“may have occurred more through learning than through conditioning.”164 Learning 
during the physical training is important for cadets because they learn how to fit into the 
profession.  
Women had improvements in their physical achievements, but this had happened 
only through overachievements. Indeed, “women’s performance may be highly valued 
when compared to that of other women but devalued when compared to that of men.”165 
Women have had hard time adjusting to the physical requirements in the armed forces 
because, first, military traditions were developed during the times when only men were 
citizen-soldiers and,166 second, women have different physiological traits from men. 
Indeed, when talking about athletic requirements in the military, it is important to keep in 
mind that the military was created by men for men and female recruits are, first of all, 
women that are trained to become soldiers with the male standards established a long 
time ago. R. Claire Snyder continues that “because the logic of liberalism requires 
individuals to be treated equally, understood to mean the same, liberal policies have been 
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unable to treat women fairly in circumstances where gender difference requires 
accommodation.”167 It is, however, more important to use empirical research to identify 
and apply the physical demands as required by each branch of the military to fulfill their 
goals than to rely upon a blanket set of outdated masculine standards for all recruits to 
meet, regardless of the tasks they will perform. 
Robert Egnell posits that military effectiveness relies on the ability to succeed on 
the battlefield, and traditional theories have overemphasized physical strength as a key 
factor necessary for the effectiveness of the armed forces. The assumption that any 
changes pose a danger to the functioning system because the structure and culture in the 
military are already adapted and capable of performing well in war is mistaken.168 
Unfortunately, athletic tests in the military academies, and especially in the air 
forces, still tend to emphasize the kinds of strength that are characteristically male—
whether or not these strengths are useful to the tasks at hand.169 For example, Judith 
Stiehm emphasizes that physical requirements may be irrelevant because pilots, as one 
example, do not need the kind of upper-body strength demanded by the criteria specified 
in the military academies.170 Similarly, fitness standards remain skewed toward a male 
ideal. Stiehm posits that “the academy’s physical testing may distinguish men with higher 
overall strength and endurance and with more positive attitudes from ‘lesser’ men, but the 
tests make little presence of relating to professional needs.”171 Indeed, “physical size is 
not controlling in technological, conventional, or guerrilla warfare.”172 Thus, existing 
physical requirements may not always reflect the demands of duty.173  
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In the U.S. Air Force Academy, for example, research indicated that cadets were 
gaining too much weight to meet physical requirements,174 and even though they were 
considered fine athletic specimens by the academy football coaches, the pilot trainers 
identified them as overweight and unfit.175 The fat concern became widely discussed in 
the air force. Air force pilot trainers did not want prospective female cadets to obtain the 
higher levels of muscle mass necessary to match male physical requirements, as muscle is 
identified to be heavier than fat. Thus, the question here becomes whether women should 
achieve the same physical standards as men or if they should have to receive different 
training with different standards.  
Another question is “whether cadets could be treated as a unit with women 
clustered in the lower half of the distribution or whether the two groups would better be 
treated separately.”176 The decision was made to teach physical development to the 
women and men separately.177 “The solution was to develop substitute courses for the 
women based on physiological differences and to use the general term ‘competitives’ for 
both the women’s and the men’s most rigorous courses.”178 “The physical training 
programs were said to have as their purpose not attaining equal absolute strength, not 
managing one’s own body weight, but giving equal efforts.”179 
The different physiological characteristics that women have actually may be 
beneficial in different situations. John Nicholson, for instance, posits that women have 
more flexible body joints than men, are less bothered by living in crowded conditions, 
and are more capable of withstanding the very hot or very humid weather conditions.180 
174 “PFT tests scores showed that the cadet women were becoming more fit; scales showed they were 
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R. Claire Snyder states that “men have greater upper body strength, but women have 
better endurance; men can run faster, but women have better eye-hand coordination.”181 
Consequently, it is reasonable to have such training standards, which would benefit each 
gender and improve their abilities and skills. Such standards should be “rigorous enough 
that they actually challenge women to achieve their maximal level of physical fitness.”182 
F. COHESION 
Another example of the military practices developed in the era when only men 
were citizen-soldiers is that traditionally, the military was trying to lure young men by 
promising to transform each recruit into “a real man.” The following advertisements were 
used: “Join the army, be a man;” “The army will make a man out of you;” or “We only 
take a few good men.”183 R. Claire Snyder posits that “while turning basic training into a 
test of manhood functions effectively in that it makes young males want to become 
soldiers, this approach, unfortunately, often entails the denigration of women.”184  
Sometimes, drill instructors refer to recruits as feminine, portraying women in 
negative terms. They use comparisons with women to signify “the epitome of all that is 
cowardly, passive, untrustworthy, unclean, and undisciplined.”185 Recruits may be 
criticized by being told “you run like a bunch of women.”186 This phrase is used to 
motivate soldiers in the military,187 but it also communicates the message that women 
cannot be effective soldiers and undermines the credibility of women at arms and, thus, 
civic equality in the whole society.  
An environment that tolerates sexism can teach soldiers to link violence and 
sexual aggression with the denigration of women. As shown in the Tailhook debacle of 
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1991, these soldiers may direct their aggression toward females.188 Consequently, it is 
better to prohibit such practices in the military because the main goal of the armed forces 
is to defend society and its democratic values, including gender equality.189  
At the same time, the tactics that contain sexism have played a valuable role in 
military socialization for a long time, prior to the inclusion of women in the armed forces. 
Sexism was used to create male bonding (cohesion) in the military.190 Cohesion is very 
important for military organization, as it creates connections between soldiers and makes 
them responsible for each other in the battlefield. Thus, cohesion is essential to military 
effectiveness.191 When allowing women in the armed forces, the tactics to establish 
cohesion without sexism have to be found. To understand how cohesion in the military 
can be created when integrating gender, there is a need to identify the important elements 
of cohesion.  
According to the RAND Corporation, which conducted a review of studies on 
unit cohesion in 2010, there are two elements of unit cohesion: social and task cohesion. 
Social cohesion “is the extent people like each other; task cohesion is the shared 
commitment group members have toward accomplishing a goal.”192 Task cohesion is 
more important to unit performance than social cohesion. Moreover, high social cohesion 
may actually cause negative group behaviors. Ellen L. Haring states that “high social 
cohesion is shown to lead to groupthink and polarized attitudes which often result in poor 
decisions by the group.”193 Anthony King also posits that “the social identities of 
soldiers, and especially their social homogeneity, is less important than whether each 
fulfills his or her allotted role. Whether they can do the job is more important than 
likeness.”194  
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Consequently, military cohesion relies more on training and professional 
competence than on personal friendships.195 U.S. Army Sergeant O’Byrne, for example, 
observed that in one of the Airborne Brigades, there are guys who openly hate each other. 
The paradox is that these guys would also die for one another. What cohesion was based 
on in this case “was not necessarily dependent on personal affection; it was based on 
competence.”196 In combat, soldiers are “united around their training, their drills, and the 
execution of these collective practices, whatever their personal differences.”197  
R. Claire Snyder argues that “sex-segregation might increase levels of unit 
cohesion…achieving the new soldier identity.”198 U.S. Lieutenant General Van Riper 
also posits that to build effective, cohesive, gender-integrated operational units, it is 
necessary to create “a training environment that builds progressively to that end.”199 One 
of the proposed measures that may improve unit cohesion is “the use of one opposite-sex 
trainer in each operational training unit and the pairing of same-sex units for cooperative 
exercises.”200 After basic training, it is suggested for soldiers to go through gender-
integrated advanced training. Thus, women and men have the opportunity to get to know 
each other better in long-term work relations, and they learn how to treat each other not 
as sexual categories, but as individuals.201  
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G. WOMEN IN COMBAT: TOOTH VERSUS TAIL 
Skaine’s research shows that “women have always and everywhere been involved 
in war.”202 Even though women have played a valuable role during war times, their 
courageous acts are not so well known and recognized as men’s are. Linda Bird Francke 
argues that “the combat issue was never about women but about men.”203 In the Gulf 
War, for example, some female soldiers were exposed to the direct combat, but these 
women did not receive the promotions commensurate with what they did.204 
Today, women may be assigned to combat billets and serve in close combat 
specialties in many countries, for example, in Australia, Norway, Canada, Germany, 
Romania, Poland, Denmark, Finland, France, Israel, Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, 
and Sweden.205 According to a 2005 study in Israel, women have superior skills “in 
discipline and motivation, maintaining alertness, shooting, managing tasks and 
organization, and displaying knowledge and professionalism in weapons use.”206 
Moreover, the Norwegian military “has employed women in all ground combat 
specialties, and in all units, since the early 1980s. The Norwegians report women increase 
operational effectiveness and there is no evidence that unit cohesion is affected.”207 
The proponents of women’s integration into the infantry identify competence as a 
key for allowing women into combat units. According to Anthony King, “women might 
be integrated into the infantry if they are judged like their male peers purely on their 
performance, not their gender, just as ethnic minorities and gay men have been before 
them. Arbitrary social criteria became less important for inclusion than competence.”208 
Mady W. Segal states that there is an analogy between racial integration and women’s 
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integration in the armed forces. At the beginning, racially mixed units were less effective 
than all-white or all-black units, but over time their performance increased.209  
However, prohibition of women from combat positions is still seen as necessary 
by adversaries of women’s integration into the infantry. Some authors suggest that 
women at arms should not be assigned to the billets with high risk of combat exposure.210 
As the arguments in support of gender-specific military assignment, policy scholars often 
“include an increased risk of depression, anxiety, suicide ideation, and posttraumatic 
stress syndrome for females in combat.”211 
Contrasting research, however, shows that the experience of combat actually 
influences the strength of the individual’s mental health. For example, “research on data 
collected between 1994 and 2001 suggests…women in combat support positions required 
hospitalization less frequently for mental health issues than women in less strenuous 
assignments.”212  
Some scholars identify mental qualifications as more important to the combat 
than brawn and provide strong arguments in support of allowing female-soldiers to serve 
in combat roles. According to Rosemarie Skaine “brain and agility are the key elements 
to combat aircraft, not brawn.”213 Women as well as men possess mental 
qualifications,214 and it is also wrong to not give freedom to one-half of the human 
intellect.215 Furthermore, “modern weaponry is more technologically operated than in the 
past.”216 The weapons are getting lighter and easier to operate. 
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The other strong argument in support of allowing female soldiers to serve in 
combat roles is that “the old front line no longer exists because present day conflicts are 
peacekeeping tasks.”217 However, even though combat actions and tasks, which are 
traditionally labeled as support functions, are different types of military missions, there 
is, indeed, a very blurred line between them. Soldiers in support non-combat units may 
also be exposed to the direct combat, hostile fire, or risk of capture. Women at arms work 
in dangerous billets when they are assigned to search the female indigenous population. 
Such tasks are traditionally labeled as support functions, but “may require females to 
engage in direct combat.”218  
According to the RAND report, women presently hold military jobs in combat 
support missions in Iraq or Afghanistan, which include, among others gunners, medics, 
helicopter pilots, truck drivers, and military police, which are all considered to be very 
dangerous occupations. To view these women at arms as those who are not recognized as 
participants of combat actions is not quite right because a lot of female soldiers who are 
taking support positions are also involved in the war actions and at risk to lose their life. 
The most dangerous occupation of the military positions in non-traditional warfare 
situations is to drive a truck, and it is still considered as a combat support role.219  
Moreover, medics, for example, have to risk their lives to save soldiers during 
combat. Specialist Monica Brown (a U.S. military combat medic), for instance, “earned 
the Silver Star for operations in Afghanistan, after she ran through insurgent gunfire and 
used her body as a shield to protect soldiers injured in an improvised explosive device 
attack.”220 Such scholars as Lawrence V. Fulton, Matthew S. Brooks, Timothy K. Jones, 
Matthew J. Schofield, and Hershell L. Moody agreed that “although the decision to 
remove gender coding of billets for combat medics would require moral courage and face 
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political opposition, the necessity to do so in current operations has evidentiary 
support.”221 
To sum up, often the opponents of gender integration imagine a traditional type of 
warfare, fought by armies on well-defined battlefields. However, this ideal is rarely the 
case in contemporary conflicts. For a military to succeed in the challenging conflicts of 
today, it must actively seek out personnel who are technologically adept and able to make 
correct decisions when presented with complicated circumstances. Research has shown 
that women are not only capable of performing the required tasks, but in many cases, 
may excel in these areas. Additionally, if women gain full acceptance into combat roles, 
the female soldiers who have already performed admirably in peacekeeping operations 
may finally gain the recognition that their actions deserve. 
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III. DESCRIPTION OF WOMEN IN UN FORCES 
The formation of UN peacekeeping forces began in 1948, during the early years 
of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In the decades since, UN peacekeepers have been deployed in 
69 operations around the world.222  
The United Nations has no standing army. It instead relies upon the contributions 
of its member states, who send troops from their own militaries or police forces to 
participate in various peacekeeping operations.223 Personnel contribution levels vary 
from state to state. Often, poorer nations contribute a larger force than some of the larger 
world players. For instance, Tanzania currently contributes 2325 police, military experts, 
and troops, while the United States only contributes 127. Ukraine, for its part, presently 
supplies 569.224  
The United Nations peacekeeping force consists of roughly 125,000 police, 
military, and civilians. Only three percent of the military personnel are women. Women 
are making the largest gains within the police.225 Between 2005 and 2010, the number of 
female police officers in UN peacekeeping missions doubled, reaching six percent.226 By 
2012, the number had reached 10 percent, and the UN created a stated goal of 20 percent 
by the end of 2014. There are currently three all-female police units in deployment 
around the world. Notably, India sent a force of 103 female police officers to Liberia that 
also brought along 22 men in supportive roles as cooks, mechanics, and drivers.227  
The UN has no restrictions excluding women from any military appointments for 
their peacekeeping operations. “Women participate as logistic officers, medical staff, 
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trainers, operations and legal officers, pilots and navigators, in intelligence, 
communication, technical, administrative, engineering and liaison functions.”228  
While the staff at UN headquarters are mostly even in terms of gender, there are 
gains to be made within the civilian staff for peacekeeping missions. Of the 6,800 
international civilian workers participating in peacekeeping and special political 
missions, women make up 29 percent of international staff and only 17 percent of 
national staff.229  
About thirty-one women have held senior leadership positions in UN operations 
since 1948. “The first female special representative of the secretary-general (SRSG) was 
appointed in 1992, Margaret Joan Antsee of the United Kingdom to the UN Angola 
Verification Mission.”230 In 2012, however, a noticeable decrease in the participation of 
women at the director level occured.231 
The UN has identified seven broad barriers that have impeded gender parity. 
These include a lack of mechanisms to properly maintain accountability, oversight and 
enforcement, inadequate measures designed to attain a gender-equal environment, as well 
as a non-existent focal point system, inflexible work arrangements, poor recruitment 
outreach, insufficient numbers of qualified female applicants, and poor data regarding 
female personnel attrition rate causes.232  
UN personnel policies also play a factor in the unequal gender distribution of 
personnel. For instance, personnel may be offered a position with long absences from 
home. Such an opportunity may be viewed by a man as a career booster; for a woman, 
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accepting this position may elicit criticism from others and be regarded as abdication of 
her family responsibilities.233 
A. CREATION OF THE UNSCR 1325  
In the 1990s, the world watched as the wars that raged in Bosnia, Rwanda, and 
West Africa demonstrated a disturbing trend: the targeting of civilian populations, use of 
sexual violence against women as a weapon, and exclusion of female voices from peace 
processes. It became abundantly clear that the global community needed to work toward 
greater participation, protection, and relief for women in conflict zones.234 
When it was Namibia’s turn to chair the UN Security Council in 2000, Netumbo 
Nandi-Ndaitwah, who was the country’s Minister of Women’s Affairs at the time, took 
the opportunity to initiate UNSCR 1325, which, in large part, used the 1995 Beijing 
Declaration and Platform for Action as its basis. Namibia, who themselves had sent 
peacekeeping troops to the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 1998, worked in 
coordination with Jamaica and Canada to pass UNSCR 1325. Notable was the 
involvement of various NGOs, including the Working Group on Women, Peace and 
Security (NGO WG), which also helped to educate Security Council members on the 
resolution. Due in large part to these efforts, UNSCR was adopted unanimously on 
October 31, 2000.235 
The main objective of the UNSCR 1325 is to strengthen the participation of 
women in peace and security efforts. It emphasizes that “the international community 
must be sensitive to and take special account of women’s vulnerable situation in times of 
war, and UN member states must cooperate to involve women in peace-building and 
conflict-resolution processes.”236 Successful implementation of UNSCR 1325 requires an 
increase in the number of women peacekeepers in peace support operations, and 
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supporting local women’s peace initiatives.237 “According to UNSCR 1325, appointing 
or recruiting more women leaders, decision-makers, military or police officers, and foot 
soldiers is a means of better protecting the safety and rights of women and girls.”238 The 
resolution also stresses the importance of education in mainstreaming gender perspective 
because the inclusion of women in military operations does not automatically mean that 
the gender perspective is guaranteed.  
B. RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING  
The recruitment process of all potential military UN peacekeepers is done on the 
national level. This means that potential female peacekeepers must compete with their 
male counterparts during the pre-selection process.239 A majority of the military “are 
recruited collectively as formed units (infantry battalion, engineering company, etc.).”240 
However, specialized military personnel, such as staff officers, make up a small 
percentage of all military personnel and are recruited individually. Uniformed 
peacekeepers undergo a pre-selection and vetting process in their countries since they 
apply through a national authority, such as a ministry of defense.  
Because officers are contributed by many countries with different policing 
systems and training standards, the UN developed pre-deployment training standards for 
potential peacekeepers to bring all participating nations to the same level of preparedness. 
In 1999, the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, which was composed of 
individuals experienced in conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, created 
the document, known as the Brahimi Report, in which specific recommendations for 
change in the existing peace operations were made. The importance of military training 
was recognized in the Brahimi Report, and recommendations about how troop-
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contributing countries should train future peacekeepers provided in the report.241 
According to the Panel, UN peacekeeping missions require adequate resources and 
equipment, and deployed personnel must be well-trained and well-informed about the 
mission environment, and conduct operations using mandates that are clear, credible and 
achievable.242  
In addition to the recommendations about training standards provided in the 
Brahimi Report, in 2008 UN drafted its first comprehensive strategy for training.243 UN 
strategy has identified three primary phases of peacekeeping training: pre-deployment 
training, induction training, and ongoing training. The pre-deployment training for 
military and police units is the responsibility of the member states, while for civilian 
personnel this training is left to the Integrated Training Service (ITS). Pre-deployment 
training is mission-specific and based on UN standards. Induction training can be 
conducted at UN headquarters or during the deployment as mission-specific training. It 
can be generic and specialized, and includes training for civilian personnel as well as 
military police. The final phase is ongoing training for military, police, or civilian 
personnel, which is performed at headquarters or in the field after induction training.244  
Before and during deployment, uniformed personnel are given training that covers 
“the protection, rights and needs of women and girls, the importance of the participation 
of women in operations and missions and cultural communication to understand the 
specific gender context in the area of operations.”245 Specific training for gender advisors 
may be provided by some nations before deployment.246  
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Uniformed personnel—women and men—who are applying for the positions of 
the UN military observers (UNMOs), however, have better defined tasks and training 
needs compared to other uniformed personnel, because UN guidelines on the training of 
UNMOs were adopted as early as 1997, which is earlier than guidelines on the training of 
other military personnel. The guidelines assume that military observers have gained many 
of the required skills during the normal path of a military career, and also presupposes 
that donating countries will conduct national-level training for the UNMOs 
themselves.247  
Overall, training activities can be general or specialized. Specialized training “is 
meant to provide trainees with skills and knowledge that are required regardless of their 
specific area of expertise (UN’s basic role and structure, international law, safety and 
security, sexual exploitation and abuse, code of conduct, etc.).”248 General training 
“targets specific functions (human resources management, logistics, computer skills, 
language skills, etc.).”249 Senior leaders receive specific and ad hoc training activities 
through “the Senior Leadership Induction Program (SLIP) and the Senior Mission 
Leaders Course (SML).”250  
The objectives of the SLIP course are “to provide newly appointed senior leaders 
in a UN peacekeeping operation with an orientation on peacekeeping issues, such as the 
main challenges faced when implementing mandates and the relationship between the 
field and UN headquarters.”251 The SLIP, a mandatory program, is facilitated by 
Integrated Training Service (ITS) and takes place twice annually at UN headquarters in 
New York.252 The SML’s objective is to prepare potential mission leaders for the roles 
and responsibilities of senior leaders in UN peacekeeping operations. SML enables 
“member state officials responsible for UN peacekeeping issues to better understand how 
247 Cutillo, Deploying the Best, 5. 






                                                 
current UN peacekeeping operations are managed.”253 SML courses are organized “by a 
host member state and DPKO, represented by ITS.”254 As explained here, attention has 
been paid by the UN to both, the training for potential peacekeepers and training for 
leadership roles for military personnel; however, underprepared personnel have been 
deployed to the field.255  
C. WOMEN AT ARMS: EXPERIENCES FROM UN 
According to international research, the presence of servicewomen in peace 
support operations has helped to create stable relations with the local population of the 
area affected by the conflict, and enhance trust in the efforts to reconstruct their countries 
and build democracy.256 Women police-peacekeepers in missions in Namibia (UNTAG), 
South Africa (UNOMSA), and Rwanda (UNAMIR) were seen by locals as less 
threatening, less violent, and more willing to listen.257 Experiences from NOBATT, the 
Norwegian battalion in Lebanon, showed that female peacekeepers developed very good 
relations with women from the local population; thus peacekeepers have gained access to 
valuable information needed for the success of the mission. An all-woman battalion of 
Ghanaians that was participating in the United Nations Mission in Liberia “established a 
relationship that improved intelligence gathering by connecting informally with local 
women who were initially reticent to report crimes or suspicious activities.”258  
The presence of UN servicewomen in conflict areas has been shown to improve 
the security of the local female population and reduce sexual and gender-based violence 
(SGBV). From February 2009 to July 2010 the United Nations Organization Stabilization 
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) set up about 60 Joint 
Protection Teams (JPT) in areas affected by conflict, tasked with making assessments and 
providing more effective protection to local populations. Forty percent of JPT personnel 
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were women. Local women reported that JPT reduced the numbers of attacks on females 
who were going to the markets, wells and fields. Furthermore, female peacekeepers were 
“seen by local women as the best interlocutors for addressing sexual and gender based 
violence.”259  
Also, the presence of females within a peacekeeping operation is a strategy that 
works “against the undisputed trend of some male soldiers behaving badly when 
deployed overseas.”260 In practice, more females within a peacekeeping operation reduce 
the number of sexual assaults committed by UN personnel. “With regard to the problem 
of sexual exploitation or abuse committed by UN personnel, women are less likely to be 
perpetrators, thus lowering the overall level of sexual exploitation or abuse 
committed.”261 In addition, an Indian all-female peacekeeping unit securing Monrovia 
introduced self-defense classes and night patrols for teenage girls to prevent SGBV in the 
community. Women peacekeepers’ presence, “alongside focused activities, effectively 
eroded intimidation and provided reassurance for vulnerable groups, creating a more 
hospitable environment for civilian women.”262 
Furthermore, women peacekeepers provide positive role models for local women; 
and thus “help contribute to more equitable gender relations within the local society.”263 
In the UNAMSIL mission in Sierra Leone, for example, “female police peacekeepers 
have played a critical role in enhancing the skills of national female police and influenced 
the recruitment of more women into the police forces.”264 Likewise, a 103-strong, all-
female peacekeeping unit from India policing Monrovia inspired local Liberian women to 
join the police force. Indian female peacekeepers’ visits to Liberian high schools and 
colleges “reportedly contributed to an increased registration of girls and women in the 
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security sector.”265 When more Liberian women joined the police force, the number of 
exploitations and abuses by peacekeepers decreased.266  
Additionally, female peacekeepers in the UN missions are a good example of 
women’s empowerment. Women peacekeepers in the UNTAG mission in Namibia, for 
example, inspired local women to aim at achieving independent elections regardless of 
gender and creation of a gender-equality-based, democratic constitution.267 The UNTAG 
mission in Namibia “is considered to be one of the UN’s most successful missions.”268 
Another example is from a mission in Sierra Leone, when one of the peacekeepers’ tasks 
was to encourage women to vote and participate in the peace-building processes. The 
goal of the mission was to create a new social structure and to support the opportunity for 
women to take decision-making positions. The mission was accomplished successfully 
with the help of female peacekeepers, and provided support for women to be able to 
generate an income and take advantage of communal childcare.269 
“Having female and male peacekeepers working side-by-side can be catalytic in 
breaking down traditional views that discriminate and marginalize women.”270 
Consequently, after four sequential rotations of the UN all-female units, “there is 
significant erosion of long-standing harmful practices that have inhibited women 
(specifically rampant child marriage, polygamy and prostitution).”271  
Thus, “the UN rightly highlights female soldiers as absolutely essential for certain 
tasks in peace operations.”272 Therefore, all member states are encouraged to send more 
265 Ten-Year Impact Study, 27. 
266 Hendricks and Hutton, Defense Reform and Gender, 4. 
267 Ibid. 
268 Stegen, Peace Support Operations from a Gender Perspective, 12. 
269 Ibid. 
270 Kraus, Enholm, and Bowen, U.S. Engagement in International Peacekeeping, 34.  
271 Ibid.  
272 Egnell, “Women in Battle, Gender Perspectives and Fighting,” 40. 
 53 
                                                 
women to peacekeeping operations.273 The UN recognizes that the number of women-
peacekeepers that is needed for operations should be leveled about 30 percent. Inger 
Skjelsba, in her research, concluded that 30 percent is a critical mass of women that have 
to be present in the military systems in order to be able to exercise influence over the 
majority of men.274 However, counting heads does not automatically mean that success is 
guaranteed for the organization. If, for example, a military organization “has up to 15-
percent women within its ranks, but they all cook and clean, this cannot be seen as being 
in line with the intentions of UNSCR 1325. The number of women in a given national 
military, as well as within an international military operation, must be weighed against 
the positions and ranks these women hold.”275  
Even though some efforts have been made to increase the percentage of women’s 
presence in the military and police forces of member states, they are not sufficient. 
Women who were sent to peace support operations have not been holding decision-
making posts.276 Thus, peace support operations often lack gender perspective that has to 
be carefully prepared. Anja Stegen posits that “women must be allowed to work together 
with men in creating conflict-resolution and peace processes that allow equal terms for 
men and women. Lasting peace and democracy are not achieved by protecting women 
from different forms of gender-related violence, but by including them in important 
decision-making positions in the community.”277 It is important to mention that “those in 
command play a vital role when it comes to policies involving gender being implemented 
and gender equality aspects being reinforced in initiatives and in the host country.”278  
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One important step toward the implementation of UNSCR 1325 is the creation of 
National Action Plans (NAPs)279 or other national level strategies (S/PRST/2004/40 and 
S/PRST/2005/52)280 for certain member states.281 National Action Plans and national 
level strategies are developed by both governments and civil society.282 “To date, there 
are 48 countries that have adopted a National Action Plan for the Implementation of UN 
Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security.”283 “National Action 
Plans offer a tool for governments to articulate priorities and coordinate the 
implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 at national level. NAPs serve as a 
guiding national policy document that is able to capture the diverse set of government 
bodies and stakeholders tasked with security, foreign policy, development and gender 
equality.”284 
To conclude, the adoption of UNSCR 1325 was a necessary step in order to put an 
end to institutionalized discrimination of half of the population―women―in conflict 
areas, and also helped to identify new roles that women play in peacekeeping operations. 
After introducing women at arms into the peacekeeping forces, it became obvious that 
women possess specific qualifications that benefit military missions.  
279 Statement by the President of the Security Council, Women, Peace and Security (October 31, 
2002): “The Security Council … encourages Member States, the entities of the United Nations system, civil 
society and other relevant actors, to develop clear strategies and action plans with goals and timetables, on 
the integration of gender perspectives in humanitarian operations, rehabilitation and reconstruction 
programmes, including monitoring mechanisms, and also to develop targeted activities, focused on the 
specific constraints facing women and girls in post-conflict situations, such as their lack of land and 
property rights and access to and control over economic resources.” From Local to Global: Making Peace 
Work for Women (New York: NGO Working Group on Women Peace and Security, 2005), 48. 
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Program and Network, accessed January 26, 2015, 
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Women, however, constitute a very small percentage (three percent within 
military personnel and 10 percent within police force) of the UN peacekeeping force 
when compared to men. This goes against the requirement of UNSCR 1325, which urges 
member states to send more women peacekeepers in peace support operations (the UN 
recognizes that the minimum level of women-peacekeepers necessary for operations is 
about 30 percent). Moreover, poorer countries contribute a larger force and the pre-
deployment training is done by member states using the UN standards, which may 
influence the quality of the deployed personnel. In total, the efforts that were made to 
increase the presence of women in peacekeeping missions are not sufficient, and women 
who were sent to peace operations have not been holding any decision-making posts. It 
was found, however, that senior leaders play an important role in providing opportunities 
for women to grow in their career and reach decision-making posts.  
Moreover, because the recruitment of potential female peacekeepers is done on 
the national level, which forces servicewomen to undergo a pre-selection and vetting 
process in their own countries, it is recommended for member states to eliminate the 
policies and processes that are complicating approval of women-volunteers by the 
national authorities.  
Member-states are encouraged to prepare NAPs as this is an important step 
toward integration of UNSCR 1325 at the national level. NAPs help member states to set 
preferences as they deal with the resolution’s implementation. 
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IV. DESCRIPTION OF WOMEN IN NATO FORCES 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) “is an intergovernmental 
military alliance based on the North Atlantic Treaty which was signed on 4 April 
1949.”285 NATO is an alliance of 28 member states. It has no standing army and relies 
upon the contributions of its member states, partner countries, and other troop-
contributing countries.286 “National capitals take the final decision on whether to 
contribute to a NATO-led operation or mission.”287  
NATO has its “high readiness and technologically advanced force comprising of 
land, air, sea and special forces units capable of being deployed quickly on operations 
wherever needed.”288 It is named NATO Response Force (NRF). “Any decision to use 
the NRF is a consensual political decision, taken on a case by case basis, by all 28 Allies 
in the North Atlantic Council (NAC).”289 “NATO’s two Joint Force Commands, based in 
Brunssum (the Netherlands), and Naples (Italy), take one-year turns to command the 
NATO Response Force (NRF).”290 “Joint Force Command Naples is in the Standby 
Command for NRF 2015.”291  
During the Chicago Summit in 2012, Allied leaders agreed to set a goal of 
deployable, interoperable, and sustainable forces (NATO Forces 2020). Such forces will 
be equipped, trained, exercised, and commanded according to the same standards, “to be 
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able to meet NATO’s level of ambition and able to operate together and with partners in 
any environment.”292  
In its 65-year history, however, NATO has never had a female secretary general, 
nor has a woman served as deputy secretary-general. The closest a woman has come to 
either of these positions was Croatia’s president-elect Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic, who 
served as Assistant Secretary-General for Public Diplomacy from 2011 to 2014. The 
organization has also never had a female supreme allied commander for Europe. 
Currently, according to the organizational chart of top civilian and military leaders only 
three women hold top positions in NATO’s organizational structure (Csilla Würtz, 
Secretary of the Council since 2013;293 Oana Lungescu, NATO Spokesperson since 
2010;294 and Marriët Schuurman, Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security 
since 2014295) in contrast to 80 men.296 If one of the NATO goals is to set example for 
other nations and to use gender perspective effectively during the operations, then there 
should be more women at the top level of the organization. 
The proportion of female soldiers in NATO member states “varied considerably, 
with some countries as low as just 3 percent and others as high as 18 percent.”297 For 
instance, in 2012 “number of women in the armies of NATO member states ranged 
between 20 percent in Hungary and 2.1 percent in Poland.”298 Of the Eastern European 
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states, Hungary ranks highest in integrating women into the military. Poland, in contrast, 
is at the bottom of these rankings. It should be noted that Poland began to open more 
positions to women in the armed forces after joining NATO; however, NATO 
membership alone has not been demonstrated to be the deciding factor on gender 
inclusiveness in the military.299 
Balkan countries are also showing improvements in employing more women in 
the armed forces. As of 2010, approximately 14 percent of Croatia’s police force was 
constituted of women and government was working to increase this number.300  In 2014, 
9.5 percent of Croatian military were women.301 Moreover, the first female general 
officer was appointed in Croatia recently.302 It is noteworthy that Croatia’s new president 
elected in 2015 is a woman, who was previously an assistant secretary general at 
NATO.303 
As of March 2011, 14 percent of Bulgaria’s army was made up of women, with 
19 percent in the air force. Of the 165 personnel sent to missions in Afghanistan by 
Bulgaria in 2011, 13 were women.304   
Since 2012 Albania has set a goal of achieving 15 percent female recruitment for 
its armed forces, though it has not indicated how long this will take. As of 2013, the 
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percentage of female personnel was 11.2 percent, which actually declined from 13.42 
percent in 2012.305 Women make up 29.8% of decision-makers in Albania's Ministry of 
Defense, and 51.2% of its specialists.306 Currently, only few Albanian women participate 
in peacekeeping missions.307 
“Deputy Secretary General Bisogniero…explained the specific steps taken by 
NATO to promote the participation of women in peace and security, including: 
developing guidelines to integrate gender issues into all levels of planning and 
operations, establishing a code of behavior for all military personnel, deploying gender 
advisors at NATO headquarters in Kosovo and Kabul, and employing gender experts in 
several provincial reconstruction teams in Afghanistan.”308 Moreover, the Deputy 
Secretary also added that senior leaders play key roles “in promoting the participation of 
women at all levels of decisionmaking.”309 
The majority of NATO member states has opened most military occupations to 
women and has implemented gender-neutral training standards.310 Women and men, 
thus, are trained using the same instructions and materials.311 Female personnel are 
gradually filling different positions in the armed forces. Thus, the numerical proportion of 
the positions occupied by women in the military is growing. However, this indicator does 
not show the full scope of integration policy. “The number indicates only the quantitative 
presence, while the other indicators help measure the quality of that presence.”312  
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Even though most member states have opened military academies to both 
genders, “the actual percentages of women who have successfully climbed the ladder 
vary from state to state.”313 Elimination of the restrictions preventing women from 
reaching the top of the military hierarchy by almost all NATO member states since 2000 
does not guarantee women access to the top positions, because, besides other restrictions, 
often “combat restrictions make it hard for women to rise through the ranks, especially in 
most Army and Marine corps.”314  
Greece was among the last member states to remove grade ceilings, and now 
women and men have the same opportunities for official promotion and training in the 
military. Bulgaria, however, still has some informal restrictions. According to a 2010 
report of the Bulgarian delegation, there are no limitations related to application for study 
from both genders; however, women are not allowed to be educated in all specialties and 
thus, they are not given the same opportunity for future career development as men. “The 
Turkish armed forces seem to be the only ones openly limiting promotional opportunities, 
primarily because women are not allowed to enlist as privates, and therefore cannot attain 
ranks that demand field experience.”315 
The states that still have conscription are recognized to be “the least responsive to 
gender integration while the states that have undergone recent professionalization and 
modernization are more responsive.”316 States’ accession to NATO influences the policy 
change, and most NATO members have changed their policy regarding the draft. “With 
the exception of Turkey, Greece, Norway, Denmark, Germany and Lithuania, all NATO 
member states have officially abandoned conscription and fully adopted a new all-
volunteer and professional armed services model.”317  
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A. GENDER INTEGRATION IN NATO  
NATO had debates concerning the role of women soldiers in the Alliance prior to 
the creation and approval of UN Resolution 1325 by the UN. In 1976 NATO’s Military 
Committee (MC) established the Committee on Women in the NATO Forces 
(CWINF).318 The CWINF is an annual conference comprising of the Chairperson, three 
Deputy Chairpersons and one Delegate (often senior military personnel working on 
gender issues within their military forces) from each NATO member state having a 
representative in the MC.319 “Partnership for Peace (PfP) and Mediterranean Dialogue 
(MD) nations are normally invited to participate as Observers to the annual CWINF 
Conference.”320 To support the work of CWINF the office on Women in the NATO 
Forces (OWINF) was established in 1998 in the International Military Staff (IMS), with 
the main goal of providing information on gender and diversity.321  
NATO, like the UN, notes, “The deployment of female peacekeepers has become 
not just desirable, but an operational imperative.”322 Therefore, in 2007, NATO “adopted 
the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) policy for the implementation of UNSCR 
1325.”323 One of the committee’s most important documents―the Committee on Women 
in the NATO Forces: Guidance for NATO Gender Mainstreaming report―was adopted 
during the annual meeting in Berlin in June 2007. “This was the Alliance’s first major 
contribution from a perspective of mainstreaming gender into military operations, 
particularly in three areas: operational planning, education and training and 
assessment.”324 
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UN Security Council Resolution 1325 influenced NATO’s further decisions about 
gender mainstreaming in peace operations. After adoption of both resolutions, the 
committee’s mandate was expanded and had to include incorporation of gender 
perspectives into NATO missions.325 In May 2009, CWINF and the Office changed their 
names to the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives (NCGP) and the NATO Office 
on Gender Perspectives (NOGP).326  
NATO NCGP so far is the only International Military Staff committee that has 
women in charge. The Committee “consists of military officers and their civilian 
equivalents from every NATO nation, who are charged with ensuring familiarity with the 
latest gender-related developments in their country.”327 The Office on Gender 
Perspectives is collecting, supplying, and sharing information on national policies, 
programs, and procedures relating to gender. NCDP is managed by an Executive 
Committee, composed of a chairwoman and a chairwoman-elect (those two should be 
women officers on active service, who are designated at national level), and two vice-
chairwomen.328  
The NATO Action Plan on Mainstreaming UNSCR 1325 into NATO-led 
operations and missions was approved in 2010. This plan “included clear actions to be 
taken by the Commanders of the NATO-led operations in Afghanistan (ISAF) and 
Kosovo (KFOR).”329 Moreover, “according to NATO’s BI-SC Directive 40-1, the full 
integration of gender perspective within NATO extends to the planning, execution and 
evaluation phases of NATO-led operations.”330 “The Chicago Summit Declaration 
(2012) further reinforced this position and underscored a high-level commitment to 
UNSCR 1325.”331  
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The priorities of UNSCR 1325 are identified through the NATO partnership 
frameworks. Thus, partner nations of the Alliance address Women, Peace and Security 
priorities through Individual Partnership Cooperation Programs, Individual Partnership 
Action Plans, Planning and Review Process and Annual National Programs.332 
“Currently 17 NATO members and 12 partner nations have National Action Plans on 
UNSCR 1325 and related Resolutions.”333 
At the 2012 Chicago Summit, heads of state and government mandated the 
“Review of the Practical Implications of UNSCR 1325 for the Conduct of NATO-led 
Operations and Missions.” In 2013, NATO completed the Review, “which focused on the 
International Security and Assistance Force in Afghanistan and the Kosovo Force, 
recognized that while significant progress has been made, there is still a general lack of 
awareness among NATO military leaders and their troops.”334 According to the Review, 
shortcomings in overall integration of gender perspective into NATO operational 
planning still exist. Moreover, other shortcomings in such specific areas as training, 
education, and the provision of gender advisers were found. To address existing 
problems, the NATO Military Authorities developed an implementation plan, and in 
October 2013, NATO defense ministers endorsed it.335  
Support of the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and gender perspective has 
become an important part of the planning of NATO-led operations in post 2014 
Afghanistan; and “the first general officer to serve as the Gender Advisor in NATO-led 
operations [was] deployed with ISAF in Afghanistan in April 2014.”336 Furthermore, the 
Alliance approved such policies and regulations for Human Resources Strategy to 
promote equality as “a policy on the Prevention and Management of Harassment, 
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Discrimination and Bullying in the Work Place.”337 The Alliance have been also 
“strengthening the recruitment processes and mentoring [programs].”338 
Moreover, NATO has been stimulating nations to implement gender policies in 
their governments. The alliance has been collecting data “on national initiatives related to 
UNSCR 1325 and related resolutions through the NATO Defense Planning Capability 
Survey and through national reports on recruitment and retention of women and gender 
training in national armed forces.”339 In addition, annual reports on gender policies, 
recruitment, training and education of female personnel in the Armed Forces and during 
the operations were requested by The Office of the Gender Advisor in the International 
Military Staff.340 
B. RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING  
Military personnel (women and men) are recruited for NATO missions on the 
national level with the approval of the national authorities. According to the Committee 
on Women in NATO Forces (CWINF) Guidance for NATO Gender Mainstreaming, 
Alliance nations should encourage participation of female personnel in NATO operations 
because NATO aims at achieving male/female mixed teams in all military missions.341 
The Alliance highly encourages the creation of gender advisors to support all NATO 
operations from force generation to re-deployment and the creation of gender action plans 
that are specific to each NATO operation.342  
Because NATO relies upon the contribution of its member states, the alliance 
stresses the responsibility of the countries to be able to provide fair recruitment at the 
national level. According to the NATO’s report, Best Practices to Improve the Gender 
Balance, recruitment of women as well as men at the national level should be no 
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different. Female and male applicants have to meet physical fitness criteria standards in 
order to be selected for military service. The same tests for both genders should be 
provided during physical testing, but standards and scores during the fitness tests should 
be adjusted taking into account biological differences between the two genders. However, 
“standards for physical tests related to certain functions (e.g., pilot, combat 
diver)…[should be] the same for men and women.”343 The score on the fitness test 
should be included in the applicant’s overall score, and the best candidates should be 
recruited regardless of their gender.344 Thus, to promote equal opportunities for women 
and men, it is highly recommended that applications from women be welcomed when 
they volunteer into the military. They should be able to enter the Military academies if 
they fulfill requirements.345 
To inspire more women to join the military, widespread information campaigns 
are recommended. They may outline “possibilities to develop military careers for women 
and to combine professional and family life by men and women.”346 Women at arms may 
be represented on recruitment websites and brochures, in recruitment centers, and during 
campaigns, school visits and other events.347 Women should receive full information 
about their career prospects in the military. Furthermore, to bring more females into the 
armed forces, the minimum targets should be “established for Recruitment and Education 
selection for women.”348 It is recommended that the percentage of women to be recruited 
into the military should be set every year and efforts should be made to obtain the goal 
that was set.349 Motherhood should not be an obstacle for women who are performing the 
physical test, as the assignment can remain open while the test is postponed.350 
Moreover, the presence of women in the recruitment and selection boards is necessary, 
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because it will provide “the female point of view and perspective and gives a positive 
perception that the boards are fair and representative.”351 
During their employment, male and female personnel (military and civilian) 
should have the same rights and duties and receive equal pay for equal positions.352 
Countries should create laws securing equal opportunities for both genders within the 
military in order to prevent gender discrimination and “improve the compatibility of 
family life and military service.”353 An institution or committee responsible for issues 
regarding military and civilian women, which can provide assistance for women to 
identify gender specific issues and concerns, should be established.354 Moreover, the 
creation of a gender adviser advisor would provide “a focal point in which gender issues 
may be raised by serving female members and also acts as an adviser for senior 
leadership within the Armed Forces.”355 
In addition, it is necessary to recognize women’s “body differences in the 
procurement of protective equipment and organizational clothing.”356 Female personnel 
should have uniforms, safety vests, and other equipment that would fit their bodies and 
allow maximum protection and functionality.357 Women also should be provided with 
separate accommodations and ablutions. “For officers, small facilities can be shared with 
the use of a flip sign or time-shared schedule.”358 During the time of pregnancy, women 
should be reassigned to modified duties “without risk of losing their assignment.”359 All 
these measures will help countries not only to promote gender equality, but also to recruit 
more qualitative personnel.  
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In order to move forward on the Women, Peace and Security agenda, it is 
recognized that NATO and its partners must focus on the key tools of education, training 
and exercises.360 In fact, the NATO Gender Perspectives Committee prepared 
Recommendations on Implementation of UNSCR 1325, which emphasized that education 
and training have a positive effect on gender issue awareness and can help apply gender 
perspectives to operations. Accordingly, action plans were to be developed to include 
NATO-provided trainings for trainers. This would help countries meet standardization 
and interoperability requirements.361 
Indeed, because coherence and interoperability are recognized as a necessity for 
Allied operations in such a multinational organization as NATO, the alliance stresses the 
need for exercise programs between nations. Military exercises are often scheduled by a 
NATO commander.362 “Geographically, NATO is working with a larger number of 
countries through its cooperation with partner countries and through the creation of 
NATO training missions as far away as Afghanistan and Africa. Institutionally, education 
and training have been reinforced through the creation in 2002 of Allied Command 
Transformation, entirely dedicated to leading the ongoing transformation of NATO’s 
military structure, forces, capabilities and doctrine.”363 Open access to education and 
training for both genders is recognized by NATO as required for achieving 
interoperability and advancing gender equality. Gender perspective training is promoted 
by NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT).364 In 2010 NATO created the 
Template for Pre-Deployment Gender Training. According to the recommendations 
provided in this document, gender experts in the creation and implementation of the pre-
deployment gender training should be created and used for the improvement of pre-
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deployment training, and lessons should be taught by the gender trainers in mixed-gender 
teams.365  
According to the NATO Best Practices to Improve the Gender Balance, gender 
education in the military should be provided for all military personnel because it raises 
awareness of individual responsibility for gender equality and creates a foundation for 
equal treatment of both genders. Gender education should include principles of gender 
equality, applicable legal regulations, leader responsibilities, train the trainer programs, 
and publicity of gender rights regulations. Trainings for both genders (such as sexual 
harassment and equal opportunity) should be provided.366 Gender training should be 
done during the pre-deployment training and include “gender awareness and cultural 
considerations with regard to gender.”367 Gender training supposes to create “an 
environment where all personnel respect each other,”368 increase unit cohesiveness, 
enhance operational effectiveness, and build respect for NATO missions.369 Integrated 
military training should be provided for both genders throughout the period of their 
service, because it “builds solidarity and unity between personnel,”370 and “establishes 
gender equality from entry into military service.”371 
Integration of the gender perspective into career development should include 
creation of the specific programs, which will help to promote equal career opportunities 
for female personnel.372 It also should include promotion of family-friendly policies to 
“ensure that family does not disadvantage female personnel’s career development.”373 
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Finally, the presence of both sexes in selection boards should be balanced to even the 
decision-making process.  
Even though some efforts have been made by NATO to improve gender balance, 
the lack of women in NATO operations is still a reality. There are too few women at the 
decision-making level. This exclusion also extends to reconstruction and peace processes; 
and women are underrepresented in operating and tactical posts. Despite the 
understanding that female participation can improve the security situation of a society 
and reduce sexual violence, NATO, in practice, has not allocated enough of the resources 
(knowledge, commitment, training, capacity, and willingness) to boost female 
participation.374  
Because the military traditions of the various member states differ, present and 
potential NATO requirements cannot be met, as there currently are not enough gender 
specialists. Overcoming these deficiencies will need time.375 
C. WOMEN AT ARMS: EXPERIENCES FROM NATO 
Skills of both female and male personnel are recognized as “essential for the 
operational effectiveness of NATO operations, especially in light of the increasing 
complexity of civil-military interaction, public relations and information sharing.”376 
Female presence “maximizes the potential skills base, drawing on the intellectual, 
practical/technical and social skills.”377 Local communities perceive female personnel as 
less threatening. Anja Stegen posits that female personnel are “more inclined to respect 
and cooperate with the local population in reaching peaceful solutions than the male 
personnel.”378 British units using female engagement teams (FETs), for example, “were 
374 Ruiz, “Women, NATO and the European Union,” 103. 
375 Ibid., 104. 
376 “NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives,” NATO, last modified February 18, 2014, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_101372.htm?. 
377 Hendricks and Hutton, Defense Reform and Gender, 4. 
378 Stegen, Peace Support Operations from a Gender Perspective, 12. 
 70 
                                                 
less frequently ambushed and experienced fewer IED [improvised explosive device] 
attacks than all-male patrols.”379 
The presence of women in NATO missions also strengthens situational awareness 
in the area of the military operation. The Swedish Provincial Reconstruction Team in 
Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan, for instance, gained valuable information about upcoming 
major events in the town through direct dialogue with local women, and this allowed the 
Swedish PRT “to create a plan for monitoring the flows of people and helped redirect 
mission assets and personnel.”380 When military knew details about the upcoming 
weddings in the area, this could help prevent an escalation of tensions between local 
community and the military. “Without a benign explanation, personnel could interpret the 
movement as an insurgent tactic or other form of aggression, which could lead to 
immediate violence as well as longer-term risks to the force from a resentful 
community.”381 Thus, women at arms in NATO operations helped to strengthen 
situational awareness and “avoid a misunderstanding that would have had negative 
implications for mission security.”382 
Women at arms are also needed to perform specific tasks such as body searches, 
because some cultures do not allow men to search women. Thus, female military 
personnel are needed at roadblocks, airports, and so on, to perform body searches on 
women who, for instance, could be smuggling weapons while using pregnancy as a 
cover.383 NATO countries, for example, assigned women to FETs, “which were formed 
to interrogate and conduct body searches of Muslim women suspects because religious 
sensitivities prevented such activities by male soldiers.”384 According to Kirsten 
379 Tobie Whitman and Jacqueline O’Neill, Attention to Gender Increases Security in Operations: 
Examples from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Washington, DC: The Institute for 
Inclusive Security, 2012), 6, http://www.inclusivesecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/NATO-Report_8.pdf. 
380 Whitman and O’Neill, Attention to Gender Increases Security in Operations, 8.  
381 Ibid. 
382 Ibid., 7. 
383 Kirsten Holmstedt, Band of Sisters: American Women at War in Iraq (Mechanicsburg, PA: 
Stackpole Books, 2008), 2. 
384 Peter Saracino, “Women in Combat: Year In Review 2013,” Encyclopedia Britannica, last 
modified October 30, 2013, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1945930/Women-in-Combat-Year-In-
Review-2013. 
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Holmstedt, “while patrolling the streets and searching homes, every Iraqi had to be 
checked, including women and children. There were no exceptions.”385  
The Dutch battalion in Afghanistan also had success because of the presence of 
the female personnel in their mixed team. Female military members established contact 
with both men and women alike. They were accepted by the local men “because they 
were seen as soldiers rather than women.”386 Afghan men found Western women to be 
interesting and were prone to be more open and talkative with them. Female soldiers 
established contact with the local male population and “were sometimes even invited by 
the men to visit their homes to talk to their wives.”387  
In mid-2010, a U.S. woman corporal from a female engagement team working in 
Afghanistan approached a male farmer in a village that had not yet been patrolled. They 
began a conversation about his crops. The man was very happy to talk to someone who 
had interest in growing his favorite crop, watermelon. The man gave the corporal 
watermelons as a gift, which she accepted. They continued talking, and the man revealed 
information he knew about “the location of several IED [improvised explosive device] 
belts laid in the area, as well as key Taliban conspirators in that region.”388 “The 
intelligence staff later verified and corroborated the information.”389 This information 
was crucial to the mission success in the area. Thus, women at arms play a valuable role 
in establishing relations with the local population and gaining valuable information. 
To conclude, NATO, along with the UN, understands that the deployment of 
female peacekeepers benefits military missions. NATO, as an international military 
organization, urges its member states and partners to mainstream gender equality in the 
military. Specific steps have been taken by the Alliance to promote the participation of 
women in peace support operations. Even though NATO highly encourages the creation 
of gender advisors to support all NATO operations from force generation to re-
385 Holmstedt, Band of Sisters, 2. 
386 Groothedde, Gender Makes Sense, 48. 
387 Ibid. 
388 Whitman and O’Neill, “Attention to Gender Increases Security,” 12–13. 
389 Ibid. 
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deployment and the creation of gender action plans that are specific to each NATO 
operation, a lack of proper gender training, education and the provision of gender 
advisers has been found, as well as shortcomings in the overall integration of gender 
perspective into NATO operational planning. 
NATO relies upon the contribution of its member states, which have different 
policies concerning women in the military. Even though majority of the member states 
have opened most military occupations to women and implemented gender-neutral 
training standards, the lack of women in NATO operations is still a reality (women are 
underrepresented in operating and tactical posts), and there are not enough women at the 
decision-making level. There is a general lack of gender awareness among NATO 
military leaders and their troops. Moreover, NATO has never had a female secretary 
general, nor has a woman served as deputy secretary-general, and neither has there been a 
female supreme allied commander for Europe. Presently, only three women hold top 
positions in NATO’s organizational structure in contrast to 80 men. There should be, 
however, more women senior leaders because senior leaders play key roles in the 
promotion of the participation of women at all levels of decision-making, and the 
presence of both sexes in selection boards should be balanced to even the decision-
making process. In addition, some restrictions such as, for example, combat restrictions, 
should be abolished by members and partner-states because these restrictions make it 
hard for women to rise through the ranks. 
The recruitment of potential female personnel for NATO forces is done similar to 
UN practices―on the national level, and women at arms undergo a pre-selection and 
vetting process in their own countries. Thus, NATO encourages members and partner-
states to provide fair recruitment at the national level.  
NATO, in keeping with the UN, identifies the value of the adoption of National 
Action Plans on UNSCR 1325. So far, 17 NATO members and 12 partner nations have 
created NAPs, which help countries identify priorities while implementing UNSCR 
1325.390 
390 “Progress Report on the Implementation of the NATO/EAPC Policy.” 
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V. UKRAINE’S MILITARY POST-INDEPENDENCE AND 
ATTEMPTS AT WESTERNIZATION 
For more than a decade, Ukraine has been undergoing changes in its economic 
and socio-political spheres in order to integrate into the European community.391 Even 
though this process is not a fast or easy undertaking, Ukraine is making progress little by 
little. An important step forward was taken on September 16, 2014, when Ukraine’s 
parliament “ratified an agreement to deepen economic and political ties with the 
European Union.”392 This change has happened after “the revolution of dignity,” also 
known as Maidan or Euro-Maidan, that took place at the end of 2013 and beginning of 
2014.  
“The revolution of dignity” showed that Ukrainian society demands pivotal 
changes in the policy of its government that should direct Ukraine away from the Soviet-
oriented past toward the European future, raising Ukrainian nationalism to influence all 
state agencies to enforce democratic principles. One of the main demands of the society 
after the revolution was the European integration of the country.393 This process involves 
reforms and changes in government institutions.394 
391 Anatoliy Grytsenko, Civil-Military Relations in Ukraine: On the Way from Form to Substance 
(Kyiv: NATO Fellowship Programme, 2000), 4, http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/98-00/grytsenko.pdf. 
392 “Ukraine Ratifies Landmark Agreement with European Union,” CBCnews, September 16, 2014, 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/ukraine-ratifies-landmark-agreement-with-european-union-1.2767449. 
393 Elena Slobodyan, “What Maidan Protesters Want?” Arguments and Facts, December 3, 2013, 
http://www.aif.ru/euromaidan/uadontknows/1036302. 
394 Members of the public created the so-called “Program of the Revolution”—a plan for immediate 
transformation of the country after the victory of the Maidan revolution. It includes a wide range of goals. 
For instance, the people of Ukraine demand:  
a) immediate resumption of unconditional implementation of paragraph 2 Article 11 of the Law of Ukraine 
“On Domestic and Foreign Policy,” Law of Ukraine “On State Program of Adaptation of Ukraine’s 
Legislation to Legislation of European Union” and ensuring Ukraine’s integration into European political, 
economic and legal space for the purpose of gaining membership in the European Union; 
b) finding ways to spread guarantees of the European collective security system to Ukraine, regardless of 
joining them. See “The Program of the Revolution.” 
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A. GENDER EQUALITY: DEMOCRATIZATION, ECONOMIC 
LIBERALIZATION AND EUROPEANIZATION IN UKRAINE 
Considering the preceding discussion, the Ministry of Defense is one of those 
institutions that needs reform to provide adequate control over the armed forces of 
Ukraine, in order, first and foremost, to be able to protect a developing democratic 
society and help sustain democratic values. Second, it also must comply with European 
standards of military interoperability (to be able to deploy troops in UN and NATO 
missions if necessary).395  
Gender equality is the key point for both—developing a democratic society in 
Ukraine and complying with UN and NATO standards.396 UN and NATO identify that 
capacities of both genders are necessary for the success of the peacekeeping missions.397 
UN Security Council Resolution 1325 “stresses the critical role women can play in all 
efforts to promote peace and security.”398 UN and NATO emphasize the need for 
partner- and member-countries to promote women’s participation in the peacekeeping 
missions.  
Moreover, “the cultural changes associated with changing gender roles and the 
‘feminization’ of leadership styles are closely linked with the spread of democratic 
institutions,”399 “In a sense the link between women’s representation and democracy 
should be self-evident, since women account for over half the population of most 
395 Snyder, “Citizen-Soldier Tradition,” 185–204. 
396 Ronald Inglehart, Pippa Norris, and Christian Welzel, Gender Equality and Democracy (Ann 
Arbor, MI: Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 2004), 2, 
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/Acrobat/Gender%20equality%20&%20democracy.pdf; and Georgi Ivanov, 
“Women and Security: How NATO and the UN Advance Gender Equality,” Policy.Mic.com, last modified 
November 23, 2012, http://mic.com/articles/19476/women-and-security-how-nato-and-the-un-advance-gender-
equality. 
397 Katharine Wright, “NATO’s Implementation of UN SCR 1325,” E-International Relations, last 
modified September 22, 2012, http://www.e-ir.info/2012/09/22/natos-implementation-of-un-scr-1325-supporting-a-
militarist-agenda/. 
398 UN News Centre, “UN Mission in Afghanistan Condemns Attacks on Schools by Insurgents,” UN, 
accessed January 22, 2015, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=41984. 
399 Inglehart, Norris, and Welzel, Gender Equality and Democracy, 22. 
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societies: if the majority doesn’t have full political rights, the society is not 
democratic.”400  
However, “support for gender equality is not just a consequence of 
democratization. It is part of a broad cultural change that is transforming many aspects of 
industrialized societies and supporting the spread of democratic institutions.”401 Ronald 
Inglehart, Pippa Norris, and Christian Welzel agree that “both women’s representation in 
parliament and a society’s level of democracy seem to reflect an underlying cultural shift 
linked with economic development.”402 Economic growth “transforms gender norms and 
brings democratization and rising numbers of women in parliament.”403 “For reasons that 
are deeply rooted in the nature of advanced industrial society, the ‘female’ leadership 
style tends to be more effective in these societies than the hierarchical, bureaucratic (and 
masculine) style that prevailed earlier.”404  
In post-communist countries “democracy is measured by an average of the 
indicators of political rights and civil liberties reported by the Freedom House.”405 
Liberalization, however, is an even more broad and complex process, and it is “measured 
by an average of various reform indicators developed by the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development covering privatization, governance and enterprise 
restructuring, price liberalization, trade and foreign exchange, competition policy, and 
banking and securities markets.”406 Interaction between democracy and economic 
liberalization differ because of its complexity and the specificity of every country.407 A 
400 Inglehart, Norris, and Welzel, Gender Equality and Democracy, 2. 
401 Ibid. 
402 Ibid., 21. 
403 Ibid., 7. 
404 “While men are relatively likely to emphasize competition, women tend to emphasize cooperation; 
and while men tend to stress domination, women tend to have a more supportive leadership style.” 
Inglehart, Norris, and Welzel, Gender Equality and Democracy, 22.  
405 Paola Giuliano, Prachi Mishra, and Antonio Spilimbergo, Democracy and Reforms: Evidence from 




                                                 
positive relationship between the indices of liberalization and democracy, however, was 
found.408 It turned out that economic liberalization can be the event of becoming a 
democracy, “where democracy is defined by strictly positive values of polity.”409  
Paola Giuliano, Prachi Mishra, and Antonio Spilimbergo mention several studies 
in their research, which prove the connection between democratization and economic 
liberalization. One of them is the Giavazzi and Tabellini study, which was conducted 
using a panel of 140 countries from 1960 to 2000, the feedback effect that economic 
reforms can cause political reforms was found, but the majority of cases showed that 
political reforms cause economic reforms.410 Reforms, indeed, play a valuable role in 
achieving economic liberalization. Research conducted by Giuliano, Mishra, and 
Spilimbergo shows that “The impact of democracy seems to be relevant for the overall 
tendency of a country to reform.”411 They found that “the more democratic the country is 
initially, the easier it is to reform.”412 Thus, democracy itself eases the possibility of the 
country’s making reforms to achieve economic liberalization.  
Another study cited in Giuliano, Mishra, and Spilimbergo’s research is by 
Dethier, Ghanem and Zoli. In their work, which was conducted using data from 25 post-
communist countries between 1992 and 1997, it was found that “political freedom and 
civil liberties facilitated economic liberalization.”413 Also cited was a study by Milner 
and Mukerjee, which concluded that democracy promotes trade and capital account 
408 Giuliano, Mishra, and Spilimbergo, Democracy and Reforms, 7. 
409 Ibid., 5. 
410 Francesco Giavazzi and Guido Tabellini, “Economical and Political Liberalizations,” Journal of 
Monetary Economics 52 (2005): 1297–1330, quoted in Giuliano, Mishra, and Spilimbergo, Democracy and 
Reforms, 7. 
411 Ibid., 18. 
412 Ibid., 17. 
413 Jean-Jacques Dethier, Hafez Ghanem and Edda Zoli, “Does Democracy Facilitate the Economic 
Transition? An Empirical Study of Central and Eastern Europe and the Formwr Soviet Union” (World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper no. 2194, 1999), quoted in Giuliano, Mishra, and Spilimbergo, 
Democracy and Reforms, 6–7. 
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liberalization,414 and Grosjean and Senik’s research, which found that democracy 
significantly impacts market liberalization. Grosjean and Senik did not find any evidence 
of a feedback effect.415  
Indeed, evidence for the assumed feedback effect of economic reforms to 
democratization is not clear.416 As an example, economic liberalization may promote the 
higher quality of democratic institutions if it empowers the democratic society’s middle 
class. However, democracy could also be reduced by economic liberalization if it 
happened before democratization of the society, causing income inequality to decrease, 
potentially resulting in violence or political discord.417 
Democratic government can benefit from economic liberalization through the 
increase in the number of working women. At a societal level, gender equality is a matter 
of fundamental rights, but it also can bring benefits to the economy,418 as equal access to 
economic opportunities improves well-being. “When women work, economies grow.”419 
Higher women’s employment rates correspond with an increase in a country’s gross 
domestic product. Furthermore, elimination of discrimination against female workers 
boosts productivity per worker.420 Thus, promoting gender equality is not only a 
necessary step, but also a beneficial one for the future development of the country.  
  
414 H.V. Milner and B. Mukerjee, “Democratization and Economic Globalization,” Annual Review of 
Political Science (2009): 163–181, quoted in Giuliano, Mishra, and Spilimbergo, Democracy and Reforms, 
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in Giuliano, Mishra, and Spilimbergo, Democracy and Reforms, 7. 
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B. CIVIL-MILITARY REFORM IN UKRAINE 
Before the Maidan revolution and growing Russian aggression against Ukraine, 
the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense had already undertaken certain reforms to strengthen 
the military and allow more women in the armed forces, including the adoption of the 
Concept of Reform and Development of the Ukrainian Armed Forces for the Period until 
2017. The main purpose of this military reform was to create new, highly qualified, well-
equipped and well-trained, professional and mobile armed forces of the European type, 
capable of addressing contemporary threats.421 This new professional military has had to 
help form more effective military organization than previously. Such military 
organization had to be “one that succeeds in performing the core tasks that the political 
leadership requests.”422  
According to the Law of Ukrainian Armed Forces, among other roles, the military 
has to protect the country against internal and external threats, be prepared to fight 
terrorism, and take part in international military operations.423 Today, Ukraine is drawn 
into fighting internal asymmetrical warfare in the eastern part of the country, where 
Russia is using Special Forces, rebels, and mercenaries as “a conscious strategy to take 
advantage of the power of asymmetry.”424 The best strategy for fighting such wars is still 
being researched, and the willingness for the organizational structure to undergo reforms 
will be a crucial part of finding the best solution.  
Furthermore, Ukraine is a charitable donor of its men of arms for international 
military operations worldwide. For example, the Ukrainian government has sent 
421 White Book of Ukrainian Armed Forces, 9. 
422 Egnell, “Women in Battle, Gender Perspectives and Fighting,” 36. 
423 Law of Ukraine about Armed Forces of Ukraine (1934-12: June 21, 2014), 
http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1934-12.  
424 Fareed Zakaria, “How West Should Handle Russia,” Fareed Zakaria GPS (blog), last modified July 
20, 2014, http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2014/07/20/how-west-should-handle-russia/. 
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approximately 37,000 service-members to peacekeeping missions since 1992;425 but only 
42 of them were women (5 officers, 2 ensign, 35 sergeants and privates).426  
C. THE CONSCRIPTION CONNECTION 
As Ukrainian society began to exert its influence over the military, the Defense 
Ministry was forced to alter some of its positions. For instance, societal opposition to the 
draft, along with other factors, affected the decision of the Defense Ministry to reduce the 
term of conscript service in 2005 to 12 months427 and the conscription was planned to be 
abolished with the transition to a professional military by 2015.428 One more important 
step in the reformation of military forces in Ukraine―the adoption of a decree that was 
set to curtail the draft in 2014―was made. This document was signed in 2013 by the 
Ukrainian president, who would later be deposed.429 More women joined the armed 
forces after the adoption of the decree.430 Interestingly, the largest proportion of women 
in Armed Forces of Ukraine have been contract-based personnel ranked from the regular 
privates to sergeants, with the majority of them in support positions in subdivisions. They 
are communicators, medics, staff experts, and air traffic controllers, and even sergeant-
instructors.431 These women at arms, however, do not take high-ranking positions, even 
though many of them have been working for decades in the military already. Such 
uneven distribution of rankings between men and women in the armed forces can be 
questioned.  
425 “Participation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.” 
426 “Is There Any Future for Women in the Armed Forces of Ukraine,” Ivano-Frankivsk Latest News, 
accessed January 3, 2015, http://news.if.ua/news/31491.html. 
427 “The Length of the Service in the Conscripts―Driven Military Service in the Armed Forces is 
Reduced to 12 Month,” Governmental Portal, accessed March 17, 2015, 
http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/publish/article?art_id=13950320. 
428 Yevhen Akmaldinov, “Development of Civil-Military Relations in Independent Ukraine,” 
(master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2003), 35, http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA414525. 
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The military places some restrictions on “what roles women can perform and have 
ceilings for their level of advancement within the decision-making ranks of the 
military.”432 Often, there are policies that restrict women from participation in combat 
actions or from rising to the highest ranks, and after identification, these policies should 
be reviewed and amended.433 Ukraine, for instance, lacks women who have been trained 
for command and engineering specialties due to the existing governing documents 
containing gender restrictions. Without this training, gender balance is impossible in the 
Ukrainian military.434  
Even though some kind of restrictions have existed for servicewomen to grow 
among the ranks throughout the history of independent Ukraine, the abolishment of 
conscription in total had to be a step ahead in allowing more women-patriots into the 
institution, which could benefit from their presence, and thus promote gender equality per 
se. Conscription, however, was quickly reinstated by the Ukrainian government in 2014 
as a necessary response to the deteriorating security situation in the Eastern Region (in 
April 2014, Ukraine’s acting President Alexander Turchynov signed the decree that 
reinstated the draft for non-exempt Ukrainian men between 18 and 25 years old).435 
Retaining the draft is a measure meant to increase the numerical composition of the 
armed forces, but it is also seen as a decision that may, first of all, harm the 
professionalization of the military and, secondly, complicate women’s access to the 
military institution that is already full of gender restrictions.  
In support of the point that conscription may harm professionalization of the 
military, Hungtington, for instance, argues that “the vocation of officership meets the 
principal criteria of professionalism;436 and the enlisted men subordinate to the officer 
corps are a part of the organizational bureaucracy but not of the professional 
432 Hendricks and Hutton, Defense Reform and Gender, 5. 
433 Ibid. 
434 “Is There Any Future for Women in the Armed Forces of Ukraine.” 
435 “Ukraine Reinstates Conscription.” 
436 Huntington, Soldier and the State, 10. 
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bureaucracy.”437 Because they may lack the proper intellectual skills and the officer’s 
professional responsibilities, they can only be considered “specialists in the application of 
violence not the management of violence. Their vocation is a trade not a profession.”438 
Additionally, “the ranks which exist in the enlisted corps do not constitute a professional 
hierarchy.”439 By maintaining such a division, armed forces prevent themselves from 
having a single hierarchical structure from top to bottom.  
As Huntington states, “the difference between the officer and enlisted vocations 
precludes any general progression from one to the other.”440 While there are occasions in 
which enlisted men do climb the ranks to join the officer corps, they are infrequent 
because the officer corps requirements in both education and training are very far from 
the grasp of the enlisted soldier.441 Consequently, a nation that relies heavily on 
conscription may see the professionalization of its military suffer.  
Indeed, professionalization in the Ukrainian military is already lacking, and the 
transition from conscript-based forces to a contract-based army remains necessary. For 
one thing, Ukraine’s conscripts serve a limited amount of time (12 months)442 in the 
military before being allowed to return to civilian life. Soldiers are constantly rotated out 
after one year of service. One year is not enough for the Ukrainian government to 
maintain a long-standing, well-trained force.443  
More fighting units are needed, but the national treasury is bankrupt, and there is 
a mass desertion of the Ukrainian army and increasing number of missing people. Poor 
outreach and preparedness means conscripts often do not understand the necessity of their 
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deployment and therefore, they become unwilling to fight. Thus, in July 2014, more than 
40 Ukrainian soldiers refused to fight on the Ukrainian side and fled to Russia.444 
Furthermore, insufficiently protected and poorly armed soldiers are facing harsh and 
dangerous conditions in the east. This overall situation affects the combat readiness of the 
troops and makes it harder for Ukraine’s government to continue the anti-terrorist 
operation in the east of the country.445 Anti-war and anti-conscription protests that have 
been known to happen in Ukraine are also contributing to the already complicated 
situation.446 
Before transitioning back toward conscription, shortages of qualified men in the 
armed forces to fulfill military recruitment needs could be filled with women who were 
willing to serve, supported by the crafting of plans for expanding women’s military 
participation.447 By reinstating conscription, the government, however, implies that 
women are not counted as equal citizen-soldiers to men and are not competent for 
protecting their homeland.  
There were instances in Ukraine when women who were willing to serve in the 
military came to recruitment centers and volunteered to sign up for the armed forces to 
defend their country alongside recruited men in the East of Ukraine. When men 
volunteered, they were accepted. Women volunteers, however, were rejected by the 
military.448 The desire of women to help their own country faces opposition, and thus, 
Ukraine’s commitment to democratic values is questioned, as well as its compliance with 
European Union gender equality standards. 
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D. WOMEN IN UKRAINE’S MILITARY: CURRENT ROADBLOCKS 
FACED BY WOMEN WHO ASPIRE TO MILITARY SERVICE 
Democratic societies open opportunities for both genders―men and women 
alike―to be able to join the armed forces because gender equality is a key tenet of both 
the development of modern democratic society and military compliance with UN and 
NATO requirements.449 The presence of women in the armed forces, however, does not 
automatically guarantee gender equality per se. It is necessary “to distinguish 
between…first recruitment of women or…increase in their numbers and the conditions 
and circumstances for statutory change (equalization of status, hierarchical progression, 
uniforms, salaries, suppression of all-female corps, etc.); access to jobs, specialties, and 
combat positions; and opening up of military schools and academies to women.”450  
Although Ukraine is striving to achieve Westernization and accomplish 
democratic reforms, which include gender equality, the country still has restrictions that 
prevent women from taking some specific jobs in the military (including the use of 
women on warships and combatant aircrafts) and enrolling in the military lyceums and 
some military academies.451 These restrictions limit the success that servicewomen could 
achieve in the armed forces. The military and other security agencies “are workplaces 
that offer opportunities for citizens to gain education and international exposure and 
experience.”452 When the opportunities for sections of society to gain education and 
experience are taken away, those people are denied access to opportunities for 
professional advancement. Thus, “women’s access to certain military positions, namely 
those related to combat, access to…positions of power inside the ranks is very uneven, 
and women are still, in fact, largely absent from decision-making spheres regarding 
449 “National Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000),” United Nations, Inter-
Agency Network on Women and Gender Equality, accessed January 4, 2015, 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ianwge/taskforces/wps/national_level_impl.html. 
450 Carreiras, “The Role of Women in the Armed Forces of NATO Countries,” 4. 
451 Eremenko, “The Defenders of the Motherland.”  
452 Hendricks and Hutton, Defense Reform and Gender, 5. 
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defense and military issues.”453 The democratic values of civil equality are questionable 
in Ukraine as long as discriminatory practices within the military exist. 
If women are discriminated against by the military institution and cannot join the 
armed forces or fully participate in military activities, the country may waste an 
opportunity to increase the number of patriotic citizens within their military ranks. 
Indeed, because conscription applies constraints on their ability to serve, some women 
from the first fully female squadron of the 39th Self Defense Hundred of Maidan,454 who 
are all civilians, found a way to go to the east of Ukraine, where combat actions are 
taking place; and now these women are defending their country.455 Moreover, the soldier 
battalion Idar, which was established in May 2014, also includes civilian women, who 
volunteered to go to the eastern region of Ukraine. These women are currently on the 
front lines (they are performing many front-line tasks, including taking part in the combat 
actions, securing territory, and performing support functions, such as cooking and 
nursing),456 and they are defending the country, as are others who are dedicated to their 
homeland.457 The women in these examples are not military personnel, and when the war 
ends, they will not receive any benefits associated with military service, nor any 
recognition or honor from the government.   
Ukrainian women who actually are contracted soldiers and desire to serve their 
country in a military context often face severe restrictions. Currently, Ukrainian mass 
media is discussing the case of Nadia Savchenko, a woman in the Ukrainian Armed 
453 Carreiras, “The Role of Women in the Armed Forces of NATO Countries,” 2. 
454 “‘Women’s Squad’ (Zhinocha Sotnia), an all-women self-defense brigade. (The literal translation 
is ‘Women’s Hundred,’ ‘hundred’ referring to the common grouping of soldiers into squads of 100.)” Sarah 
D. Phillips, “The Women’s Squad in Ukraine’s Protests: Feminism, Militarism, and Nationalism on the 
Maidan,” American Ethnologist 41, no. 3 (2014): 417, 
https://www.academia.edu/8241376/The_Womens_Squad_in_Ukraines_Protests_Feminism_Militarism_and_Nationali
sm_on_the_Maidan. 
455 “Those Women Who Were Participating in the Maidan Revolution Are Now Continuing Their 
Fight in Hotspots of Ukraine,” Public Radio, last modified June 12, 2014, 
http://hromadskeradio.org/2014/06/12/zhinki-yaki-proyshli-cherez-maydan-prodovzhuyut-borotbu-u-garyachih-
tochkah-ukrayini-sotnik-anna-kovalenko/. 
456 Max Levin, “Soldier Jane,” LB.ua, last modified September 27, 2014, 
http://blogs.lb.ua/maks_levin/280757_vita.html. 
457 Lily Dvoretskaya, “Ukraine ATO: Girl-Soldier Battalion ‘Idar,’” Free Republic, last modified July 
5, 2014, http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/3176347/posts. 
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Forces who is presently imprisoned in Russia. Savchenko, who hoped to realize her 
lifelong dream of becoming a fighter pilot, faced significant obstacles in the achievement 
of this goal from the Ukrainian military system. After three previous attempts to enter the 
University of the Air Forces in Kharkiv were rejected on the basis of her gender, she 
finally received an appointment with the general, who told her that she should first serve 
a year in the conscript military (which is akin to telling her to stop trying, given the 
previously stated challenges and restrictions women in Ukraine face when volunteering 
to join the conscript military) prior to entering the university. Following this exchange, 
Savchenko joined the Armed Forces as a contractor, where she was given the job of radio 
operator. Unsatisfied with this position, she joined the Marines (she passed a required run 
of 15 kilometers in the snow while carrying a 15-kilogram backpack), and she chose to be 
sent to Iraq to serve alongside male Marines.458  
Upon returning from this tour in Iraq, she again applied at Kharkiv’s University of 
Armed Forces, but this time was told she did not have enough military experience. 
Persistently, she petitioned Anatoliy Grytsenko (then Ukraine’s Minister of Defense), 
who finally granted her request. However, after her graduation as a specialist in SU-24, 
she was told that the Ministry of Defense prohibited women from flying reactive-engine 
aircraft, and she was forced to settle for a navigator position onboard an Mi-24 
helicopter.459 During the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, Nadia Savchenko was captured by 
separatists and sent to Russia, where she has been charged in what many view as a 
politically motivated case.460  
Nadia Savchenko, who was clearly dedicated to her goal of military service, was 
forced to endure significant systematic discouragement by the military academic 
organization in Ukraine. Helena Carreiras explained that “officers trained in military 
academies and schools or those employed in combat-oriented functions tend to score 





                                                 
much higher on institutional features than the remaining personnel.”461 Institutional 
orientation is important in order for the military officers to move to the higher ranks. 
Those who are represented in top hierarchical positions possess wide knowledge of the 
institutional features. Women, who are restricted from entering military academies and 
employment in combat-oriented functions, thus, receive a message from the military that 
undermines female institutional values, promoting an occupational orientation instead of 
institutional occupation.462 Consequently, Nadia Savchenko’s experience highlights a 
need for Ukrainian military academies to implement new policies that encourage female 
applicants, rather than discourage them.  
E. WHY INCREASE WOMEN’S ROLE IN THE ARMED FORCES OF 
UKRAINE? 
Ukrainian armed forces can become effective463 in fulfilling the roles required of 
a modern military after they obtain the necessary capabilities and readiness.  
Ukraine has been participating in peace support missions since 1992 (about 
37,000 soldiers have taken part in different missions worldwide).464 Very few women at 
arms from Ukraine have taken part in these operations when compared to men, so there 
are many fewer female soldiers than male in Ukraine that have received the experiences 
necessary to address contemporary threats, including the situation in Eastern Ukraine.  
Recalling the example of Nadia Savchenko, who was told that she did not have 
the necessary military experience to enter the air force academy, even after serving a tour 
in Iraq, it is apparent that the Ukrainian military institution is biased against women. How 
can women be expected to gain necessary military experience when the existing military 
system actively discourages them from participating?  
461 Carreiras, Gender and the Military, 85–86. 
462 Ibid. 
463 As mentioned earlier, the effectiveness of the military forces is best determined by whether or not a 
state is prepared to fulfill any or all of the major roles, including fight, and is prepared to fight external 
wars, internal wars or insurgencies, global terrorism, internal and external crime, and maintain the ability to 
provide support for humanitarian assistance, and to be prepared for and take part in peace support 
operations. Bruneau and Matei, Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations, 66. 
464 “Participation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.” 
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The Maidan revolution in 2013–2014 showed that people want Europeanization 
(Westernization) of the country, which implies compliance with the European security 
system and promotion of human rights, including gender equality. Moreover, the 
Constitution of Ukraine already promotes human rights and liberties and guarantees 
equality between men and women,465 yet women still face discrimination. Democratic 
society, which Ukraine is striving to develop, supposes to open opportunities for both 
genders―men and women alike―to be able to join the armed forces and be treated as 
equals inside the institution because gender equality is a key tenet of both the 
development of modern democratic society and military compliance with UN and NATO 
requirements.466  
The Ukrainian government stays passive—or, rather, impassive—about the desire 
of women to serve in the military, and thus, to have the same rights and responsibilities as 
men. Western countries, however, understand the advantages of the utilization of women 
in military missions, with peace support operations given priority.  
Why not effectively utilize women in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, therefore 
reducing costs connected with maintaining conscription, improve intelligence gathering, 
and reduce soldiers’ exposure to attacks and ambush in Eastern Ukraine? As the 
Ukrainian government plans to increase the number of servicemen in 2015,467 women 
may fill a critical personnel resourcing requirement by being available to serve in the 
armed forces. Would Ukraine and specifically, the Ukrainian military, accept women as 
warriors and send them into combat? This is a complicated question to answer. This 
question “points to the deep anxiety about changing a well-established cultural 
paradigm.”468  
  
465 Constitution of Ukraine, “Article 24 of the Constitution of Ukraine,” 
http://iportal.rada.gov.ua/uploads/documents/27396.pdf. 
466 “National Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000),” 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ianwge/taskforces/wps/national_level_impl.html. 
467 “Ukraine Defense Doctrine,” Global Security, accessed January 17, 2015, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/ukraine/doctrine.htm. 
468 Tessa Poppe, “Women’s Right to Fight Has Nothing to Do with Push-Ups,” Task & Purpose, June 
9, 2014, http://taskandpurpose.com/womens-fight-right-fight-push-ups/. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
For much of human history, military culture has been hyper-masculine, and, 
indeed, has often helped to denigrate women and their chances for a greater role in 
society. The rise of the postmodern military has coincided with the relatively recent trend 
to increase the role of women in democratic societies, and along with this we have seen a 
dramatic change in how women are viewed in the military context.  
Women represent half of the society and diversity of it, and according to 
Janowitz’s theory, females can reduce tensions between civilian and military world and 
thus strengthen civilian control over the military. They also help to professionalize the 
military and reduce disciplinary problems as women who volunteer for the armed forces 
are better educated than men. Even though female soldiers tend to have different abilities 
and capacities from men, these differences may bring success to the mission.  
Women indeed can enhance the effectiveness of the armed forces as they are well 
suited for the roles in contemporary military operations. The most common types of wars 
today are more intellectual and have new objectives: “they involve a multitude of actors 
fighting for the hearts and minds of the local, as well as global, population whose 
perceptions of the conflict often determine the outcome.”469 Consequently, for a military 
unit to be successful it must be prepared to fight these new types of wars, and women at 
arms play valuable role in war winning. The presence of servicewomen in peacekeeping 
missions, for instance, is recognized by NATO and the UN as vitally needed and 
irreplaceable. UNSCR 1325 stresses the need of participation of women in peace and 
security efforts. Women at arms in UN and NATO armed forces, indeed, have validated 
that female presence while dealing with local population yields positive results, such as 
reduced tensions and enhanced credibility with the civilian population. 
Experiences from NATO and UN peacekeeping operations identify that female 
soldiers bring success to the mission because they are known to be more effective in 
specific roles. One of the benefits of the use of female soldiers in peace support 
469 Egnell, “Women in Battle, Gender Perspectives and Fighting,” 37. 
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operations is the improvement to tactical intelligence, thus actively reducing soldiers’ 
exposure to ambushes and IED attacks.470 Female soldiers also perform specific tasks 
(such as body searches), which men cannot do due to the cultural restrictions in some 
countries.471 Furthermore, it is understood that the side that finds ways to control the 
civilian population will have victory in the war, and “by improving trust and credibility 
with the civilian population, host nation civil-military interaction becomes more 
effective, reducing the amount of time needed to achieve success.”472 Women are 
recognized to be better interlocutors and at making connections with locals, and thus they 
are adept at winning the hearts and minds of the population while freeing other soldiers to 
perform traditional functions.  
Moreover, the less aggressive nature of women can be an advantageous 
characteristic for personnel that take part in peace support operations because these 
specific operations require more intelligence than force. According to Anja Stegen, “in 
peace support operations, personnel are expected to keep aggression under control and 
strive for understanding; violence in this context is a failure.”473  
In addition, female military personnel serve as monitors of excessive behavior 
among male soldiers. Even though the presence of women cannot guarantee that no 
sexual abuse will happen, a strong presence of women reduces the amount of such 
incidents. 
Despite all the efforts made by UN and NATO to promote gender equality in the 
military; however, the lack of women in UN and NATO operations is still a reality. The 
low percentage of women in military operations is the consequence of the policies of the 
nation-members, because UN and NATO have no standing army and rely upon the 
contribution of their member states and donor-states. Potential female peacekeepers 
undergo a pre-selection and vetting process in their countries, competing for the position 
470 Whitman and O’Neill, “Attention to Gender Increases Security in Operations,” 12–13. 
471 Holmstedt, Band of Sisters, 2.  
472 William Kornblum, Sociology in a Changing World, 8th ed. (Belmont, CA: Thomson Learning, 
2008), 75. 
473 Stegen, Peace Support Operations from a Gender Perspective, 15. 
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not only with their male counterparts but also dealing with challenges relating to their 
own government policies. Moreover, the UN put responsibilities for pre-deployment 
training on the donor-countries, and thus underprepared personnel have sometimes been 
deployed to the field.  
The presence of female military personnel, however, should not be seen as needed 
in the military only because women are expected to bring gender-specific unique 
capabilities into the armed forces; instead they must be seen as equal-rate soldiers in an 
environment where diversity is respected. The military has been forced to adapt to other 
changing societal perspectives on civil rights issues in the past, and the integration of 
women is no different.  
Very often women’s exclusion from the military was justified with flawed 
assumptions. However, for every critique against the inclusion of women in the military, 
strong evidence to the contrary was found. Even though women at arms have proven that 
they have the abilities necessary to pass rigorous testing and endure real life military 
situations, female inclusion in the armed forces should not be seen as a matter of physical 
achievements, but rather a matter of allowing the second half of the population into a 
previously closed-off institution.  
Ukraine is in a stage of change today, which was brought with the Maidan 
revolution in 2013–2014. Thus to comply with the demands of the society for better life 
in democratic European society, respecting human rights and equality, Ukraine’s military 
should encourage, rather than discourage, female participation in military operations and 
begin effective utilization of the capabilities of women at arms. Women are choosing the 
military as a career path today. To dedicate oneself to a certain career path, one should 
feel confidence in her own chances of success.474 Consequently, when allowing women 
to join the military, the possibilities for equal personal career growth should be 
considered.  




                                                 
The creation of the National Action Plans for the Implementation of UN Security 
Council Resolution 1325 in Ukraine will help the government to articulate priorities and 
coordinate the implementation of the resolution.475 It will, however, take time for women 
to start holding command posts as this requires proper education, institutional awareness, 
field training, and experience, but, as large number of nations believe, the momentum is 
there to make this an eventual reality.476 
 
475 “Key Victims Know Too Little.” 
476 Obradovic, Gender Integration in NATO Military Forces, 56. 
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